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Executive Summary 
The world’s second and third largest economies are engaged in a standoff over the 
sovereignty of five islets and three rocks in the East China Sea, known as the Diaoyu 
in Chinese and the Senkaku in Japanese. Tensions erupted in September 2012 when 
Japan purchased three disputed islands from their private owner to keep them 
from the nationalist governor of Tokyo. In response, Beijing implemented a series 
of measures including the establishment of overlapping administration in the disput-
ed waters. Both sides’ law enforcement agencies and militaries currently operate 
in close proximity in disputed naval and aerial space. Unlike foreign ministries, 
these actors have less institutional interest in containing crises and enjoy an infor-
mation monopoly allowing them to shape domestic perceptions. The two countries 
lack the mutual trust and communication mechanisms to manage incidents, let alone 
to discuss intentions or operating protocols. In the event of a skirmish, heightened 
nationalism, especially in China, could constrict the room for diplomatic manoeuvres 
to de-escalate the situation.  
China’s actions reflect a “reactive assertive” tactic used previously in the South 
China Sea, whereby it exploits perceived provocations in disputed areas by other 
countries to take strong countermeasures to change the status quo in its favour. 
Interpreting the Japanese government’s decision to purchase the islands as a unilat-
eral change to the status quo, China implemented a series of pre-planned actions 
with the goal of changing the facts on the ground. The most important was when 
Beijing declared territorial baselines around the islands in September, thus increas-
ing the number and length of its law enforcement patrols to directly challenge Ja-
pan’s de facto control of the area. Many Chinese strategists perceive Japan to be a 
former empire continuing on a downward slide while China’s star is rising. For them, 
the time is right to respond resolutely and stake its ground with its eastern neighbour.  
Nationalism makes the sovereignty dispute in the East China Sea a highly explo-
sive issue for China, more so than the South China Sea. Due to the brutal Japanese 
occupation of China in the 1930s, sentiments over the status of the Diaoyu/Senkaku 
Islands run deeper in the Chinese psyche than any other territorial dispute in 
modern Chinese history, with the exception of Taiwan. Beijing has for years exploited 
anti-Japan sentiment through patriotic education campaigns and has used nation-
alism to justify assertive actions. But while in the past it could more easily dial up 
or down nationalism through control of state-run media, the rapid rise of Internet 
use has eroded that control and begun to shape the context of policymaking. The 
government must now satisfy increasingly outspoken and critical citizens. 
Complementary economic ties – essential to both given China’s prioritised 
commitment to strong economic growth and Japan’s desire to rebuild its stagnated 
economy – have provided strong incentives to keep this dispute from escalating 
into armed conflict, a scenario neither side wants. But despite expressions by both 
governments that they wish to avoid a war, potential for escalation has increased 
and there is deepening pessimism on both sides over the prospects of a peaceful 
settlement. The strategic mistrust that characterises relations has been aggravated 
by their respective domestic situations. Without top leaders setting the tone for 
crisis mitigation, a tradition of back-channel diplomacy has disappeared. The rela-
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tive weakness of China’s foreign ministry complicates bilateral relations and pre-
vents effective crisis management, as it is the official – and often the only – channel 
open to Tokyo. Meanwhile, the “China hands” in Japan who traditionally helped 
manage the relationship have been sidelined. While there is little hope of a reso-
lution of the sovereignty dispute in the near future, Tokyo and Beijing urgently 
need to work toward establishing communication mechanisms and strengthening 
crisis mitigation in order to avoid a larger conflict.  
Beijing/Brussels, 8 April 2013
International Crisis Group 
Asia Report N°245 8 April 2013  
Dangerous Waters: China-Japan Relations 
on the Rocks 
I. Introduction: A Dormant Dispute Reignites 
The dispute over the sovereignty of Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands in the East China 
Sea claimed by the People’s Republic of China (hereafter China), Japan and the 
Republic of China (Taiwan) has brought China-Japan relations to a new low.1 The 
island chain has significant strategic, historical and potentially economic value. 
Chinese naval analysts see control of the islands as critical to accessing the Pacific 
Ocean beyond the first island chain linking South Korea, Japan’s Okinawa Prefecture, 
Taiwan and the Philippines.2 Japan has been administering the islands and from 
its perspective, losing them would mean providing China a platform to monitor 
Japanese and U.S. military activities in Okinawa, about 400km in the east, and po-
tentially curtail freedom of navigation.3 With regard to economic value, a 1969 UN 
Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East report mentioned possible large 
hydrocarbon deposits in the seabed, but very limited exploration activities have been 
carried out because of the dispute.4  
Adding sensitivity to the issue, both countries face additional maritime and 
sovereignty disputes and sense a general deterioration in overall maritime security.5 
China is engaged in heated quarrels with several countries in the South China Sea 
 
 
1 This report mentions the Chinese and Japanese names for the islands in alphabetical order. 
The island group lies about 170km north of Japan’s westernmost island Ishigaki, 330km south 
east of the Chinese mainland coast, and 170km north east of Taiwan (which China considers 
one of its provinces). “Full Text: Diaoyu Dao an Inherent Territory of China”, State Council In-
formation Office White Paper”, September 2012. “Fact Sheet on the Senkaku Islands”, Japanese 
foreign ministry, November 2012. For previous Crisis Group reporting on similar issues, see 
Asia Reports N229, Stirring up the South China Sea (II): Regional Responses, 24 July 2012; 
N°223, Stirring up the South China Sea (I), 23 April 2012; and N°108, North East Asia’s Un-
dercurrents of Conflict, 15 December 2005. For previous reporting on Chinese foreign policy, 
see Asia Report N°200, China and Inter-Korea Clashes in the Yellow Sea, 27 January 2011; 
Asia Briefings N°112, China’s Myanmar Strategy: Elections, Ethnic Politics and Economics, 21 
September 2010; N°100, The Iran Nuclear Issue: The View from Beijing, 17 February 2010; 
Asia Reports N°179, Shades of Red: China’s Debate over North Korea, 2 November 2009; 
N°177, China’s Myanmar Dilemma, 14 September 2009; N°166, China’s Growing Role in UN 
Peacekeeping, 17 April 2009; and N°153, China’s Thirst for Oil, 9 June 2008. 
2 Crisis Group interviews, Beijing, August 2012. See also Xu Qi, “Maritime Geostrategy and the 
Development of the Chinese Navy in the Early Twenty-First Century”, Naval War College Review, 
vol. 56, no. 4 (Autumn 2006). 
3 Crisis Group interviews, Tokyo, October 2012.  
4 The U.S. Energy Information Administration estimates that the entire East China Sea has be-
tween 60 and 100 million barrels of oil and between 1 and 2 trillion cubic feet of natural gas in 
proven and probable reserves. “East China Sea”, Analysis Brief, U.S. Energy Information Ad-
ministration, 25 September 2012. See also Guo Rongxing, “Territorial Disputes and Seabed Pe-
troleum Exploration: Some Options for the East China Sea”, Center for Northeast Asian Policy 
Studies, Brookings (Spring 2010). 
5 Crisis Group interviews, Beijing, September 2012; Tokyo, October 2012.  
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and Japan has unresolved maritime disputes with Russia and South Korea.6 Both feel 
compelled to demonstrate resolve to defend their claims over the Diaoyu/Senkaku 
for fear that other rival claimants would take advantage of any perceived weakness.7  
The two countries claim the islands under different elements of international 
law. Japan’s case rests on the principle of “occupation of terra nullius”, or land 
without owner; it asserts that when it formally incorporated the islands through a 
January 1895 Cabinet decision, it had confirmed that they were uninhabited and 
showed no trace of having been under the control of China.8 China claims historical 
title, stating it has evidence that it exercised sovereignty over the islands as they 
were discovered, named and used during the Ming Dynasty (1368-1644) and ad-
ministered as a part of Taiwan by the Qing Dynasty (1644-1912).9 It argues that 
the islands were ceded to Japan as part of the April 1895 Treaty of Shimonoseki 
that ended the First Sino-Japanese War, and therefore should be returned to 
China under the Cairo and Potsdam Declarations (1943 and 1945), which stated 
that Japan must return all territories seized through war.10 The key question under 
international law appears to be whether China established historical title before 
1895.11 Taiwan also claims the islands based on the same historical title as China.12  
After the Second World War, the islands were occupied, along with Ryukyu Is-
lands, by the U.S. under the 1951 Treaty of San Francisco and were reverted to 
Japanese administration in 1972.13 The U.S. plays an important role in the dispute 
as it asserts that the 1960 U.S.-Japan Security Treaty covers the Diaoyu/Senkaku 
Islands.14 
Both sides also disagree over the delineation of their respective exclusive eco-
nomic zones (EEZ) in the East China Sea.15 With this level of complexity, a judicial 
or arbitration settlement would be the most logical solution.16 
 
 
6 Crisis Group interviews, Beijing, September 2012; Tokyo, October 2012. China and Taiwan have 
a number of maritime disputes in the South China Sea with Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia 
and Brunei. For more analysis, see Crisis Group reports, Stirring up the South China Sea (I) and 
Stirring up the South China Sea (II): Regional Responses, both op. cit. Japan has a territorial dis-
pute with North and South Korea over the Takeshima/Dodko islets and with Russia over the 
Northern Territories/Kuril Islands. However, while South China Sea tensions remain high, there 
have been no comparable incidents in recent years around the Takeshima/Dodko or Northern 
Territories/Kuril Islands. 
7 Crisis Group interviews, Beijing, September 2012 and Tokyo, October 2012. 
8 For Japan’s full legal position, see “MOFA: Fact Sheet on the Senkaku Islands”, Japanese foreign 
ministry, November 2012.  
9 For China’s full legal position, see “Full Text: Diaoyu Dao an Inherent Territory of China”, 
State Council Information Office White Paper, September 2012.  
10 “Full Text: Diaoyu Dao an Inherent Territory of China”, op. cit. 
11 Steven Wei Su, “The Territorial Dispute over the Tiaoyu/Senkaku Islands: An Update”, Ocean 
Development and International Law, vol. 36 (2005), p. 49. 
12 See Appendix B, “Republic of China (Taiwan)’s claim to the islands”. 
13 China and Taiwan were not invited to participate in the negotiations and are not signatories to 
the treaty. See Linus Hagström, Japan’s China Policy: A Relational Power Analysis (New York, 
2005), p. 119. 
14	Since the 1971 Okinawa Reversion Treaty, U.S. administrations have stated that while the U.S. 
takes no position on the territorial disputes, the treaty does cover the islands as they are under 
Japanese administration. See Section V, “The U.S. Factor as Seen by Tokyo and Beijing”. 
15 China claims jurisdiction, which includes exclusive rights to resource exploration and devel-
opment, based on the natural prolongation of its continental shelf, which it says extends to the 
Okinawa Trough. Japan claims an EEZ that extends to the median line that bisects the East 
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Yet, there is little chance that an international tribunal will be able to examine 
the issue. Japan does not formally acknowledge that a dispute exists and believes 
it would therefore be up to China – which it says is seeking to challenge Japan’s 
“valid control” of the island chain – to refer the issue to the International Court of 
Justice (ICJ).17 Japanese officials also point out that, unlike Japan, China does not 
accept the compulsory jurisdiction of the court.18 Chinese analysts say that Beijing 
has no faith in the ICJ’s fairness, as it is a “Western” system that will only produce 
results “biased against China”.19  
Since the normalisation of Sino-Japanese relations in 1972, the two countries 
had followed a strategy of consigning any settlement to the distant future, pre-
serving “the absence of escalation as well as the absence of compromise”.20 They 
were able to prevent small incidents from spiralling out of control and damaging 
diplomatic relations through refraining from provocation and engaging in effective 
and often discreet diplomacy when problems arose. China claims this was due to 
an agreement between leaders, but Japan denies such an understanding existed.21 
Strong economic ties have also acted as a stabilising factor.22 
In recent years, in the context of an ascendant China, many Chinese analysts 
increasingly thought Japan had the better end of this “gentlemen’s agreement” 
since it had been administering the islands alone while taking steps to reinforce 
 
 
China Sea. Both natural prolongation and median line principles are allowed under Article 15 
and Article 76 of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), which the two countries 
ratified in 1996. Their overlapping claims leave about 40,000 sq km west of the Okinawa 
Trough and east of the EEZ’s median line disputed. The Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands fall within the 
disputed area. “Part II: Limits of the Territorial Sea” and “Part VI: Continental Shelf”, UNCLOS, 
10 December 1982. Steven Wei Su, op. cit., p. 46. 
16 The UN Charter and UNCLOS provide several means for the peaceful settlement of maritime 
disputes: negotiation and conciliation, ie, taking the dispute to a state or international body 
such as the UN Secretary-General; arbitration, which can be done ad hoc or in a tribunal; and 
judicial settlement by the International Court of Justice (ICJ) or the International Tribunal for 
the Law of the Sea (ITLOS). “Methods of resolving maritime boundary disputes”, Chatham 
House International Law Discussion, 14 February 2006. 
17 “Press conference by Prime Minister Yoshihiko Noda on the occasion of the 67th Session of 
the United Nations General Assembly”, Opening Statement, Prime Minister of Japan and his 
Cabinet, 26 September 2012.  
18 Crisis Group interviews, Tokyo, October 2012. Japan recognises the jurisdiction of the ICJ as 
compulsory but “on condition of reciprocity” with the other state. “Declarations Recognising the 
Jurisdiction of the Court as Compulsory: Japan”, International Court of Justice, 9 July 2007.  
19 Crisis Group interviews, Beijing, August-September 2012. There has been some discussion in 
policy circles in Tokyo about a potential understanding whereby China would agree to submit 
the dispute to the ICJ and Japan would admit the existence of a dispute. Unfortunately this 
proposition is a non-starter in Beijing. 
20 M. Taylor Fravel, “Explaining Stability in the Senkaku (Diaoyu) Islands Dispute”, in Gerald 
Curtis, Ryosei Kokubun and Wang Jisi, (eds.), Getting the Triangle Straight: Managing China-
Japan-US Relations (Brookings, 2010), pp. 144-164. 
21 For more information, see Section II.C “Timing”. 
22 Japan is China’s fourth largest trading partner while China is Japan’s largest with bilateral 
trade valued around $340 billion in 2011. As of June 2012, Japan ranked first in cumulative in-
vestment in China, reaching $83.97 billion. “The economics behind the China-Japan dispute”, 
The Financial Times Blogs, 24 September 2012; “Key Facts on China-Japan trade and economic 
ties”, Xinhua News Agency, 22 September 2012; “Diaoyu Islands rift takes toll on China-Japan 
economic ties”, Xinhua News Agency, 29 September 2012.  
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its claim.23 They also saw a balance of power shifting in China’s favour vis-à-vis 
Japan and felt more confident in asserting Chinese claims in the East China Sea.24 
An incident in September 2010 – when a Chinese fishing boat rammed two Japan 
Coast Guard (JCG) vessels near the islands – brought these issues to the forefront. 
Japanese analysts believe the fallout from this led to Japan’s purchase of three of 
the disputed islands from a private owner in September 2012, which gave China 
the opportunity to alter the status quo.25 By the beginning of 2013, the two countries 
were locked in a volatile standoff with Chinese and Japanese law enforcement 
vessels in close proximity, creating the risk for a dangerous clash. Despite expressions 
by both governments that they wish to avoid a military conflict, the potential for 
escalation has increased.26 
This report is based on interviews conducted in Beijing, Shanghai and Tokyo. 
Crisis Group spoke with a wide range of individuals, including officials, govern-
ment analysts, scholars, diplomats and journalists, most of whom requested to 
remain anonymous to comment on sensitive policy decisions. It analyses internal 
dynamics in both China and Japan that led to the deterioration in bilateral relations, 
missteps and misunderstandings that contributed to this latest round of tensions, 
as well as missed opportunities to establish crisis mitigation systems. This report 
does not take a position on China’s and Japan’s competing legal claims nor does 
it include discussion of Taiwan’s claim to the islands in the main text. 
 
 
23 Crisis Group interviews, Beijing, September 2012, February 2013. 
24 Ibid; See also Stephanie Kleine-Ahlbrandt, “A Dangerous Escalation in the East China Sea”, 
Wall Street Journal, 4 January 2013. 
25 Crisis Group interviews, Tokyo, October 2012.  
26 Upon winning election, Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe called the Sino-Japanese rela-
tionship “one of extremely important bilateral ties” and pledged to make efforts to restore the 
“mutually beneficial relationship”. “Japan’s incoming Prime Minister Shinzo Abe pledges to mend 
ties with China”, Agence France-Presse, 22 December 2012. Commenting on Abe’s victory, China 
responded by saying that “a healthy and stable Sino-Japanese relationship is in line with the 
fundamental interest of both countries and their people”. “外交部例行记者会” [“Regular press 
conference of the foreign ministry”], Chinese foreign ministry, 25 December 2012. 
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II. Divergent Views of the Island Purchase 
The September 2012 crisis started with widely divergent views held by Beijing 
and Tokyo on the latter’s decision to purchase the disputed islands. Japanese of-
ficials said they began informing China of the plan and explaining its rationale in 
June, but months of communication failed to bridge differences. Despite analysis 
of more than twenty potential scenarios, taking into account military, economic, 
diplomatic and cultural consequences, Tokyo was still “shocked” by Beijing’s strong 
reaction.27 Two months after the purchase, a former senior Japanese diplomat 
said China’s firm response was still “a mystery” to policymakers in Tokyo.28  
A. Tokyo’s Perspective 
Shintaro Ishihara, then-governor of Tokyo, announced on 16 April 2012 a plan 
for the Tokyo metropolitan government to purchase three of the Diaoyu/Senkaku 
Islands from the Kurihara family and build on them, citing the need to counter 
China’s challenge of Japanese control.29 The government of Prime Minister Yoshihi-
ko Noda felt compelled to act pre-emptively for fear that if Ishihara purchased the 
islands and built structures on them, a far larger crisis would result and send ten-
sions with China spiralling. The Noda government felt that it lacked the legal means 
to stop Ishihara, and due to the significant public support for the Tokyo governor’s 
plan to purchase the islands, it decided in May to open its own bid to purchase 
them.30 Noda was also reportedly driven by “a sense of responsibility” to defend 
the country’s territory.31 Tokyo had expected a negative reaction from China, but 
was trying not to “lose bigger” should Ishihara purchase and develop them.32 
 
 
27 Crisis Group interviews, Tokyo, October 2012; Beijing, November-December 2012. 
28 Ibid; “Japanese prime minister admits ‘miscalculation’ over Diaoyus”, South China Morning 
Post, 21 September 2012.  
29 This report presents Japanese names in the Western custom of given name followed by family 
name, in reverse of Japanese convention. In August 2012, Ishihara vowed to send a research team 
to land on the islands and dared the central government to stop him. “Ishihara says he will defy 
government orders, land on Senkaku Islands”, The Asahi Shimbun, 25 August 2012. In September, 
he demanded that the central government build a port on the islands in exchange for him drop-
ping his purchase bid. “Governor of Tokyo: Develop Senkakus, and I’ll halt purchase”, The Asahi 
Shimbun, 1 September 2012. Explaining the reasons that prompted his action, he pointed out 
that “China has embarked on radical movements in an attempt to knock down Japan’s effective 
control on the Senkaku Islands. That’s scandalous”. “Ishihara, citing Chinese moves, plans to buy 
Senkaku Islands”, The Asahi Shimbun, 17 April 2012.  
30 Crisis Group interviews, Tokyo, October 2012. A reported 70 per cent of the Japanese sup-
ported Ishihara’s plan. Hitoshi Tanaka, “Politicising the Senkaku Islands a danger to regional 
stability”, East Asia Forum, 19 August 2012. The Japanese public contributed over 70,000 do-
nations, totalling ¥1 billion in two months. “Donations to metro government to buy Senkaku 
Islands top ¥1 billion”, The Japan Times, 2 June 2012.  
31 “Inside Look: Japan tried but failed to avert disaster in China dispute”, The Asahi Shimbun, 
26 September 2012. 
32 Ibid; Crisis Group interviews, Tokyo, October 2012. The decision was not unchallenged, most 
notably by Uichiro Niwa, the Japanese ambassador to China, who publically warned that the 
island purchase would harm bilateral relations. “Tokyo warned over plans to buy islands”, 
Financial Times, 6 June 2012. 
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Japan viewed the island purchase as an internal transfer of property from a pri-
vate owner to the central government; “from the left hand to the right”.33 While 
such an act altered the status of the islands under Japanese domestic laws, Tokyo 
believed that it was unrelated to issues of sovereignty and could not be considered a 
change to the bilateral status quo.34 A former Japanese diplomat explained in fur-
ther detail, “there are two types of ownership with regard to territories. There are 
property rights and there are sovereignty rights”. He said the state already had 
sovereignty rights to the islands, and was only acquiring the property rights 
through the purchase.35 
B. Beijing’s Interpretation 
China’s interpretation was twofold. It felt that the islands’ ownership transfer ag-
gravated an already unacceptable situation, Japan’s control over the islands and 
denial that they are disputed.36 According to a Chinese analyst, Beijing never agreed 
that the private owner possessed the islands in the first place.37 While a military 
analyst conceded that although China could understand that “legally there was no 
change to the status quo”, nevertheless “politically the action … violated the basic 
agreement that both countries shelve the dispute and kick it into the long grass”.38 
In his October press conference, Chinese Vice-Foreign Minister Zhang Zhijun 
termed “absurd logic” the notion that “it is better for the government to ‘pur-
chase’ the islands than the right-wing forces”, saying it amounts to “asking China to 
choose between two kinds of poison”.39 
Beijing considered the purchase a deliberate unilateral change to the status quo.40 
Many Chinese analysts adopted the narrative of a “good cop, bad cop” conspiracy 
by Japan to solidify its claim.41 Policy groupthink – where lower-level analysts 
and bureaucrats assess the leadership’s position and provide information and 
analysis accordingly – reinforced the theory that Noda engineered the drama with 
Ishihara to deal a blow to China.42 This version was easily adopted by the Chinese 
 
 
33 Crisis Group interview, Tokyo, October 2012. 
34 Crisis Group interviews, Tokyo, October 2012; Beijing, November 2012. There were two camps 
in the Japanese government regarding the course of action after Ishihara’s announcement and the 
subsequent outpouring of public support: the government could either let him buy the islands and 
claim that it could not stop him or buy the islands itself. Crisis Group interview, Tokyo, October 
2012. “Inside Look: Japan tried but failed to avert disaster in China dispute”, op. cit. Some Japa-
nese and Western analysts have offered other options, though it is unclear if they would have been 
able to prevent a similar response from China. Crisis Group interviews, Tokyo, October 2012. 
35 Crisis Group interview, Beijing, November 2012.  
36 Crisis Group interview, Beijing, October 2012.  
37 Crisis Group interview, Beijing, October 2012. The Chinese official position is: “Japan has no 
right to engage in any form of buying or selling Chinese territory”. “外交部副部长张志军就钓鱼
岛问题举行媒体吹风会” [“Vice Foreign Minister Zhang Zhijun briefed Chinese and foreign jour-
nalists on the Diaoyu Dao issue (transcript)”], press conference, Chinese foreign ministry, 
26 October 2012.  
38 Crisis Group interview, Beijing, December 2012.  
39 “外交部副部长张志军就钓鱼岛问题举行媒体吹风会”, [“Vice Foreign Minister Zhang Zhijun 
briefed Chinese and foreign journalists on the Diaoyu Dao issue (transcript)”], op. cit.  
40 “乐玉成：两国关系困难因日方单方改变钓鱼岛现状”, 人民网 [“Le Yucheng: Difficulties in bilat-
eral relations are due to Japan’s unilateral change to the status quo of the Diaoyu Dao”, The People’s 
Daily (online)], 28 September 2012. 
41 Crisis Group interviews, Beijing, September, November 2012. 
42 Crisis Group interviews, Beijing, August-October 2012. 
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policy apparatus given the very different political and legal systems in the two 
countries. In contrast with Japan, Chinese regional officials who oversee provinc-
es are appointed and rotated by the central government, and “respond to signals 
set by the centralized party leadership”.43 While they enjoy significant autonomy 
on economic issues, they are expected to heed the government line on important 
political and security issues. Furthermore, in China it would be impossible for a 
private individual to purchase an island, let alone one that is disputed.  
C. Timing 
Japan had several more months to complete the purchase or even explore other 
options, but expedited the process in part to complete it before China’s once-in-a-
decade leadership transition in November 2012. Japanese analysts said the timing 
was meant to avoid “punch[ing] the new [Chinese] leaders in the face”. Tokyo also 
calculated that a new leadership in Beijing might offer opportunities for reconcil-
iation.44 Unknown to Japan, then-incoming Chinese leader Xi Jinping had already 
been put in charge of the “Leading Small Group on the Protection of Maritime 
Interests”.45 
Many in Beijing, however, suspected Japan had deliberately timed the purchase 
before its power transfer because it thought the leadership would be weak or dis-
tracted.46 According to an account, Chinese leaders were focused on ensuring a 
smooth handover and did not wish to be forced to deal with Japan.47 Adding to 
Chinese sensitivity, the run-up to the leadership transition saw ample signs of 
fierce factional struggles.48 A government official responsible for security noted in 
September that the date of the eighteenth National Congress of the Communist 
Party of China (CPC), which would formalise the handover, had not yet been set – 
a sign of uncertainty. He asked, “does Japan want to exacerbate the dispute to 
disrupt the … Congress?”49 There was also a sense that if China were perceived as 
being too soft in its reaction, its rival claimants “will reach out for a yard after taking 
an inch” in the belief that Beijing might want to avoid external troubles during 
the transition.50 Another analyst said that Japan had to be made into an example to 
prevent rival claimants from “exploiting us every time [there is a party congress]”.51  
 
 
43 Yukong Huang, “China’s Conflict between Economic and Political Liberalization”, SAIS Review, 
vol. 32, no. 2 (Summer/Fall 2012), p. 53. 
44 Crisis Group interviews, Tokyo, October 2012.  
45 The group, “中央海洋权益工作领导小组” in Chinese, was set up sometime in the second half 
of 2012. “中国外交决策的基本过程”, 东方早报［“Basic process of China’s foreign policy decision-
making”, Oriental Morning Post], 18 March 2013. 
46 Crisis Group interviews, September-November 2012. 
47 Crisis Group interview, Beijing, September 2012. 
48 “China seals Bo’s fate ahead of November 8 leadership congress”, Reuters, 28 September 2012. 
“China faces new scandal over crash of a Ferrari”, The New York Times, 3 September 2012. 
49 Crisis Group interview, Beijing, September 2012. 
50 Crisis Group interview, Beijing, September 2012. At the time Japan completed the island 
purchase, on the eve of China’s leadership transition, both the size of the next Politburo Standing 
Committee (PBSC) and its membership – with the exception of two – were still uncertain and 
reportedly the subject of intense closed-door jockeying. See Cheng Li, “The Battle for China’s 
Top Nine Leadership Posts”, The Washington Quarterly, vol. 35, no. 1 (Winter 2012), pp. 131-145. 
51 Crisis Group interview, Beijing, November 2012. 
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Signals from both sides were misinterpreted. Prime Minister Noda had sent a se-
cret envoy in early September to Beijing, which according to a Chinese source gave 
President Hu Jintao the impression that Japan could be persuaded to abandon the 
purchase plan.52 This reportedly prompted Hu to agree to a meeting with Noda at 
the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation Summit in Vladivostok (8-9 September). 
Japanese officials had been surprised by the Chinese side’s acceptance of the re-
quest for the meeting and interpreted it as a good sign. They had assumed that 
President Hu had been made fully aware of Japan’s intentions to finalise the pur-
chase the following day.53 The Chinese side, however, had agreed to the encounter 
on the belief that Noda could still be convinced to back away from the move.54 
During the meeting, Hu stressed to Noda that nationalising the islands was illegal.55 
When Japan went ahead with the purchase, this was seen as a loss of face for 
Chinese leaders.56 Shortly thereafter, Xi Jinping was put in charge of the issue.57  
The purchase reignited the disagreement over the basis on which China and 
Japan had refrained for decades from trying to resolve the sovereignty issues. Ac-
cording to Beijing, there was a “gentlemen’s agreement” between earlier high-level 
leaders to “shelve the dispute”.58 Japanese politicians at times have alluded to earlier 
Chinese leaders’ statements that the dispute should be resolved by future genera-
tions, but Tokyo has explicitly denied the existence of an agreement with China to 
shelve the dispute.59 Tokyo maintained that Japan followed a unilateral policy of 
 
 
52 Crisis Group interview, Beijing, March 2013.  
53 According to a Japanese source close to Noda, because Japanese diplomats had been regular-
ly briefing the Chinese foreign ministry about the timing of the island purchase, “our sense was 
that he [Hu] was supposed to know,” thus Noda did not explicitly say it in his meeting with Hu. 
Another Japanese source said the meeting lasted only about ten minutes and was hastily put 
together, without the presence of the director of the Japanese foreign ministry’s China and 
Mongolia Division. Nor was there a Chinese-Japanese interpreter, meaning that translation had to 
go through English, further limiting communication. Crisis Group interviews, Tokyo, October 2012; 
Beijing, November 2012. 
54 Crisis Group interviews, Beijing, March 2013; Tokyo, October 2012. 
55 In addition, Premier Wen Jiabao and Wu Bangguo, chairman of the Standing Committee of 
the National People’s Congress (NPC) at the time, both issued separate warnings to Japan. “‘Ab-
solutely no concession’ on Diaoyu Islands, says Chinese premier”, Xinhua News Agency, 10 Sep-
tember 2012; “Top legislator reiterates China’s stance on Diaoyu Islands”, Xinhua News Agency, 
10 September 2012. 
56 Crisis Group interviews, Beijing, September-October 2012, March 2013. 
57 See Section V.A.1 “Challenges of Japan policymaking in China”. 
58 China maintains that during the negotiations on the China-Japan Joint Communiqué (1972) 
between Zhou Enlai and Japanese Prime Minister Kakuei Tanaka and the China-Japan Treaty 
of Peace and Friendship (1978) under Deng Xiaoping, leaders of the two countries reached an 
agreement to shelve the dispute over the sovereignty of the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands. “搁置争议
，共同开发” [“Shelve dispute, seek joint development”], Chinese foreign ministry, www.mfa.gov.cn/ 
chn//gxh/xsb/wjzs/t8958.htm. Deng said, “it does not matter if this question is shelved for 
some time, say 10 years. Our generation is not wise enough to find common language on this 
question. Our next generation will certainly be wiser. They will certainly find a solution acceptable 
to all”. Taylor Fravel, “Explaining Stability in the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands Dispute”, op. cit., p. 157. 
59 On 22 October 1990, Chief Cabinet Secretary Misoji Sakamoto reaffirmed Japan’s sovereignty 
claim but referenced Deng Xiaoping’s statement that the islands dispute should be solved by a 
later generation. Kyodo News Agency, in Foreign Broadcast Information Service-East Asia 
(FBIS-EAS), 23 October 1990, p. 3 as cited in Erika Strecker Downs and Phillip C. Saunders, 
“Legitimacy and Nationalism: China and the Diaoyu Islands”, in Michael E. Brown, Sean M. 
Lynn-Jones, Steven E. Miller (eds.), The Rise of China (Cambridge, MA., 2000), p. 56. After 
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“ensuring a peaceful and stable maintenance and management of the Senkaku 
Islands”.60 The denial has always been taken by China as a political affront. Japan’s 
island purchase was seen in Beijing as final proof that Japan had disrespected the 
tacit understanding and, in the minds of Chinese analysts, freed Beijing from ad-
hering to the status quo.61  
The misunderstanding over the island purchase and resulting political frictions 
only served to catalyse tensions. At the root of problem, an ascendant China increas-
ingly saw itself at the short-end of the gentlemen’s agreement as Japan enjoyed de 
facto administration of the islands.62 Its growing capability provided China the 
confidence that the time was approaching to challenge Japanese control and the 
island purchase provided it the opportunity. 
 
 
China promulgated its February 1992 “Law of the People’s Republic of China on its Territorial 
Waters and their Contiguous Areas”, which included the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands, then-
Japanese Prime Minister Kiichi Miyazawa reportedly pointed to a prior understanding with Deng 
Xiaoping over the islands. The Japanese foreign ministry then issued a correction denying such an 
agreement existed. Reinhard Drifte, “Japanese-Chinese Territorial Disputes in the East China 
Sea–Between Military Confrontation and Economic Cooperation”, Working Paper, Asia Re-
search Centre, London School of Economics and Political Science (2008), p. 8. The policy that 
“no dispute” exists reportedly arose from within the “legally-minded” Treaties Bureau in the 
Japanese foreign ministry. Linus Hagström, Japan’s China Policy: A Relational Power Analysis 
(New York, 2005), p. 132  
60 Crisis Group interview, Beijing, January 2013. “MOFA: Fact Sheet on the Senkaku Islands”, op. 
cit., Attachment 1: Map of the Senkaku Islands. Crisis Group interview, Beijing, January 2013. 
61Crisis Group interview, Beijing, February 2013. 
62 Crisis Group interviews, Beijing, August-September 2012; January 2013.  
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III. China’s Strategy 
A. From Japanese Control to Overlapping Administration 
Immediately following the purchase of the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands, China imple-
mented a string of measures, termed “combination punches”, that bore the hall-
marks of a well-planned campaign with multi-agency coordination and high-level 
decision-making. 63  Top leaders delivered harsh rebukes of Japan, with then-
Premier Wen Jiabao vowing to “never yield an inch” and then-Vice President Xi 
Jinping calling the island purchase “a farce”.64 The foreign ministry stated that the 
purchase was “illegal and invalid, and changed nothing about the historical fact that 
Japan had invaded and occupied Chinese territories”.65 Defence Minister Liang 
Guanglie said China’s military “reserves the right to take further actions”.66 The 
commerce ministry warned that Japan’s action “will inevitably affect and damage 
the normal development of Sino-Japanese economic and trade relations”.67 Chinese 
provincial- and central-level officials were also ordered to cancel visits to Japan and 
meetings with Japanese counterparts.68 
Other punitive measures were taken in which the Chinese government denied any 
official coordination. Tourist agencies, some state-owned, cancelled trips to Japan. 
Consumers boycotted Japanese products while goods from Japan faced delays at 
several Chinese ports due to longer customs inspections.69 Violent anti-Japan pro-
tests erupted in dozens of cities, damaging some Japanese shops and factories.70 
 
 
63 “中国捍卫钓鱼岛主权有理有据”, 人民日报 [“China has every reason and right to defend sover-
eignty of Diaoyu Island”, The People’s Daily], 27 September 2012. 
64 “中国在领土主权问题上绝不会退让半步”, 新华社 [“China will not yield an inch on sovereignty 
issues”, Xinhua News Agency], 12 September 2012; “习近平称日方应悬崖勒马 停止损害中方主
权言行”, 新华社 [“Xi Jinping said Japan should pull back before it is too late, and stop saying or 
doing things that harm Chinese sovereignty”, Xinhua News Agency], 20 September 2012. 
65 “中国外交部就日本宣布’购岛’发表声明”, 新华社 [“Foreign ministry issues statement regard-
ing Japan’s ‘island purchase’ announcement”, Xinhua News Agency], 10 September 2012. 
66 “中美防长面对面谈钓鱼岛问题 梁光烈称保留进一步行动权利”, 新华社 [“Chinese defence min-
ister  talks with U.S. defence secretary, Liang Guanglie said Beijing reserves the right to take further 
action”, Xinhua News Agency], 19 September 2012. 
67 “商务部例行新闻发布会 2012 年 9 月 19 日”, 中国商务部 [“Regular press conference of the 
commerce ministry on 19 September 2012”, Chinese commerce ministry], 19 September 2012. 
68 Crisis Group interview, Beijing, September 2012. “China cancels diplomatic event with Japan 
over islands”, BBC, 23 September 2012.  
69 “Japan’s spat with China takes big toll on tourism”, The Wall Street Journal, 27 November 
2012. Chinese officials and scholars maintained that this was the result of “spontaneous market 
forces” rather than government coordination. Crisis Group interviews, Beijing, September and 
November 2012. Japanese officials and analysts saw these as “nasty actions” or “small tricks” 
for which Beijing refused to admit responsibility. Crisis Group interview, Tokyo, October 2012. 
“Japan Inc. losses mount over isle spat”, The Wall Street Journal, 1 November 2012; “Customs 
delaying some Japanese imports to China”, Associated Press, 24 September 2012.  
70 “Anti-Japan protests in China swell, turn violent”, Associated Press, 15 September 2012. The 
violence also alienated Japanese business leaders with deep-rooted ties in China. A Japanese 
scholar noted that it was especially shocking to see Chinese rioters target a Panasonic plant, as 
the company’s founder was asked personally by Deng Xiaoping to come to China to help the 
country develop its electronics sector. He said many Japanese are asking, “why do we now get 
this?” Crisis Group interview, Tokyo, October 2012. 
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State media trumpeted photos and video footage of military drills, including island-
landing exercises in the Yellow Sea.71  
But a quieter move may have had more serious repercussions. On 10 September, 
the day Tokyo formally declared it was purchasing the islands, Beijing announced 
territorial sea baselines around the islands.72 According to Chinese law, the move 
placed the disputed islands under Chinese administration and was therefore a direct 
challenge to Japan’s control of the islands.73 This was the first time that China an-
nounced baselines for territories that it did not already control. Chinese experts ex-
plained that from then on, entrance by Japanese public service or Self-Defence Force 
(SDF) vessels into the area would be considered intrusions into China’s territory 
and a violation of its sovereignty.74  
Such an unprecedented move to formalise its claim obliged China under its own 
laws – and in the court of domestic public opinion – to assert jurisdiction over the 
waters surrounding the islands.75 Its two largest maritime law enforcement agencies 
– the China Marine Surveillance (Marine Surveillance) and the Fisheries Law En-
forcement Command (Fisheries) – which already competed with each other in the 
South China Sea for budget and clout, were further empowered to assert sover-
eignty in the East China Sea. They immediately increased their patrols in waters 
previously dominated by the JCG.76 For Chinese experts, the immediate aim is to 
establish “overlapping control” in the disputed waters.77 Some have stated that in 
this way, Japan would at least have to admit that a dispute exits.78  
 
 
71 “海军、空军、陆军、二炮实兵演练 随时准备维护国家主权”, 新华社 [“Navy, Air Force, Army 
and Secondary Artillery Force conducted combat exercise, ready at all time to protect national 
sovereignty”, Xinhua News Agency], 12 September 2012. 
72 “中华人民共和国政府关于钓鱼岛及其附属岛屿领海基线的声明”，新华社 [“Statement by the 
Chinese government on territorial sea baselines surrounding the Diaoyu and its affiliated Islands”, 
Xinhua News Agency], 10 September 2012. The baselines formed the basis from which China drew 
its territorial seas and other maritime areas under its jurisdiction. Crisis Group interview, Beijing, 
September 2012. 
73 Chinese officials declared that the move provided “the legal basis according to Chinese do-
mestic laws and relevant international laws to administer Diaoyu Islands waters”. The last and 
only other time when China announced its territorial sea baselines was in 1996, around part of 
its mainland and the Paracel Islands. “外交部：中国政府公布钓鱼岛等领海基线意义重大”, 新华
社 [“Foreign ministry: Announcement by the Chinese government of Diaoyu Islands territorial 
sea baselines significant”, Xinhua News Agency], 13 September 2012. Under Chinese law, the 
area 12 nautical miles from the baselines is China’s territorial sea. Law of the People’s Republic 
of China on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone (1992), Article 3. 
74 Crisis Group interviews, Beijing, September 2012; and “专家解读领海及毗连区法”, 法制日报 
[“Experts explain the law on the territorial sea and the contiguous zone”, Jurisprudence Daily], 16 
September 2012. Chinese law has stated that foreign non-military vessels have the right to “inno-
cent passage” in China’s territorial sea, but if foreign governmental vessels for non-commercial 
purposes violate Chinese laws or regulations during passing, they can be asked to leave immedi-
ately. “外交部：中国政府公布钓鱼岛等领海基线意义重大” [“Foreign ministry: Announcement by 
the Chinese government of Diaoyu Islands territorial sea baselines significant”], op. cit. 
75 Stephanie Kleine-Ahlbrandt, “Dangerous Waters”, Foreign Policy, 17 September 2012. 
76 See Section V.D “Maritime Agencies in Ascendance”. 
77 “专家称中日较量可能致钓鱼岛交叉控制局面”, 京华时报 [“Experts say China-Japan contest 
may lead to overlapping control of Diaoyu Islands”, Jinghua Times], 21 September 2012. A 
former China Marine Surveillance chief went further by stating that Beijing’s primary goal and 
task following the baseline announcement was to eventually drive Japan’s coastguard out of the 
disputed areas. “前海监官员：钓鱼岛不排除发生撞船等小冲突”[“Former Marine Surveillance 
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B. Reactive Assertiveness 
Beijing’s responses to Japan’s island purchase reflect a tactic that it has used in other 
maritime disputes, which can be termed “reactive assertiveness”: Beijing uses an 
action by another party as justification to push back hard and change the facts on 
the ground in its favour.79  
In April 2012, the Philippines maladroitly sent a warship to arrest Chinese 
fishermen operating near the disputed Scarborough Shoal, prompting China to 
send two civilian maritime patrol ships. Manila soon replaced the navy ship with 
a civilian coast guard vessel, and a standoff ensued between the two countries’ law 
enforcement vessels. By mid-June, both sides withdrew on the pretext of rough 
weather, but Chinese Marine Surveillance and Fisheries vessels soon returned, 
roped off the mouth of the lagoon to keep Filipino fishermen from entering, and 
established routine patrols of the area. Previously, neither China nor the Philippines 
maintained a permanent presence in the area and fishermen from the Philippines, 
Vietnam, Taiwan and China operated untroubled in and around the large reef. 
Taking advantage of the Philippines’s action of sending a warship to arrest Chinese 
fishermen, China established effective control of the shoal, thus changing the status 
quo in its favour.80 All the while, the blame was laid on the Philippines for having 
responded to a fishing dispute by sending in a naval vessel. 
 Similarly, on 21 June 2012, Vietnam passed a maritime law with new navigation 
regulations covering the disputed Spratly and Paracel Islands. China reacted by es-
tablishing Sansha City to encompass the islands and 2 million sq km of the South 
China Sea, complete with a military garrison.81 The China National Offshore Oil 
Corporation, a state-owned enterprise, then proceeded to offer oil exploration leases 
in nine blocks located within the disputed area in the South China Sea.82 Chinese 
analysts have said that Beijing was made aware many months ahead of the impend-
ing law by Vietnam, giving it ample opportunity to craft its response. Vietnamese 
 
 
official: small clashes such as boat collision near Diaoyu Islands cannot be ruled out”], China.com, 
12 September 2012. 
78	Chinese analysts have further said that even if Japan admits a dispute exists, China will not 
withdraw its maritime surveillance vessels from disputed waters. Crisis Group interviews, Beijing, 
November 2012. This makes any such admission from Japan less attractive than it already is. 
79	Stephanie Kleine-Ahlbrandt, “Choppy Weather in the China Seas”, Le Monde Diplomatique, 
December 2012. 
80	Taylor Fravel, “Redefining the Status Quo”, The Diplomat, 2 November 2012. See also Carlyle 
A. Thayer, “South China Sea: Impasse at Scarborough Shoal”, Yale Global, 12 April 2012.  
81	“Vietnam law on contested islands draws China’s ire”, The New York Times, 21 June 2012. 
“民政部发言人就国务院批准设立地级三沙市答问”, 新华社 [“Civil affairs ministry spokesperson 
answers questions on State Council’s approval to establish Sansha City”, Xinhua News Agency], 
21 June 2012. “Sansha military garrison established”, The China Daily, 27 July 2012. China first 
established an administrative office over its claims in the South China Sea in 1959. It then es-
tablished Sansha City in June 2012, giving it administration over 200 islets, sandbanks and 
reefs of the Xisha [Paracel Islands], Zhongsha [Macclesfield Bank] and Nansha Islands [Spratly 
Islands]. It covers 13 sq km of island area. “China’s Sansha starts forming government”, Xinhua 
News Agency, 17 July 2012.  
82	“Notification of part of open blocks in waters under jurisdiction of the People’s Republic of 
China available for foreign cooperation in the year of 2012”, press release, China National Offshore 
Oil Corporation, 23 June 2012. “Vietnam spars with China over oil plans”, The Wall Street 
Journal, 27 June 2012. The bids attracted informal interest from international companies, but 
apparently none bid on the blocks due to its disputed status. “Analysis: China unveils oil offensive 
in South China Sea squabble”, Reuters, 1 August 2012. Crisis Group interview, Beijing, March 2013. 
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officials said that communications with China began six months in advance of the 
law’s passage, but that nothing in their conversations warned them that the response 
would be so drastic.83 
China’s dispute with Japan in the East China Sea showed a use of the same 
“reactive assertiveness” tactic. Chinese analysts confirmed that territorial baselines 
had been drawn long before but had been withheld from public release as Beijing 
had been concerned about appearing expansionist. The Japanese purchase an-
nouncement then provided an opportunity to implement the plan.84 A scholar joked 
that he refers to Ishihara and Noda as “comrades” for giving China the chance to 
change the situation around the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands in its favour.  
Another feature of reactive assertiveness is that the measures taken by China 
were designed to be irreversible. Scarborough Shoal remains inaccessible to Fili-
pino fishermen and the development of Sansha City continues apace.85 With regard 
to the Diaoyu/Senkaku, Chinese officials and analysts have made it clear that there 
is no going back to the previous status quo of Japan administering the area alone.86 
The Chinese foreign ministry has urged Japan to “face the reality that the situa-
tion around the Diaoyu Islands has fundamentally changed”.87 The director of the 
State Oceanic Administration, which oversees the Marine Surveillance, stated in 
November 2012 that “there is no time limit” to Chinese patrols around the Diaoyu/ 
Senkaku Islands.88 According to an analyst, after months of regular patrols in the 
disputed waters, Beijing’s goal became to wear down Japan into “accept[ing] the new 
situation” and making overlapping control “the new status quo”.89  
In each case, Beijing saw its actions as justified not only as responses to other 
parties’ provocations, but also to rectify situations that it believed to be unacceptable. 
Many Chinese analysts describe a pattern in these situations as one of “small coun-
tries bullying a big country”.90 With regard to the Diaoyu/Senkaku, many Chinese 
 
 
83 Crisis Group interviews, Beijing, November 2012, January 2013; Ho Chi Minh City, November 
2012.  
84 Crisis Group interviews, Beijing, September, November 2012. 
85 “Philippines accuses China of chasing fishing boats”, Associated Press, 26 January 2013. Fol-
lowing Beijing’s provision of 10 billion yuan ($1.6 billion), Sansha officials planned to build 
more piers, airports and other infrastructure projects and to increase tourism. “Investment in 
Sansha a provocative step for China”, Global Times, 27 December 2012. “China’s youngest Sansha 
City preparing tourism”, The People’s Daily, 28 January 2013. 
86 “军舰调海监 无期限巡钓岛”, 明报 [“Warships transferred to Marine Surveillance, no time lim-
it to Diaoyu patrol”, Ming Pao], 11 November 2012. Crisis Group interviews, Beijing, December 
2012, January 2013. 
87 “2012 年 10 月 31 日外交部发言人洪磊主持例行记者会” [“Foreign ministry spokesperson 
Hong Lei’s regular press conference on 31 October 2012”], press release, Chinese foreign minis-
try, 31 October 2012. 
88 “军舰调海监 无期限巡钓岛” [“Warships transferred to Marine Surveillance, no time limit to 
Diaoyu patrol”], op. cit. Crisis Group interviews, Beijing, December 2012, January 2013. 
89 Crisis Group interview, Beijing, March 2013.  
90 “戴秉国：小国（像）菲律宾也不能欺负大国”，中国日报网 [“Dai Bingguo: small countries 
(like the Philippines) cannot bully a big country”, China Daily (online)], 16 May 2012. In stark 
contrast with the impression from outside China that its actions have become more assertive, 
the prevailing view among Chinese officials and analysts is that the tensions and disputes are 
attributable to the failure of regional states to respect Chinese interests as reflected in the collu-
sion between the U.S. and regional claimant states targeted against China. “三位学者：中国须
加速开发南海”，环球时报 [“China needs to accelerate development in the South China Sea, 
Global Times”], 23 June 2011.  
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analysts believed that Beijing had been too soft by allowing Japan to solely adminis-
ter the disputed islands and solidify control over them for so long.91 According to 
an analyst, China’s strategy was motivated by a sense that time was running out 
and that regular patrolling would be necessary “or else China’s sovereignty claim 
would become weaker and weaker”.92 This view reflects a widely held belief in China 
that Japan could cement its claim if its de facto control could run fifty years unchal-
lenged, through the international legal doctrine of “acquisition prescription”.93  
Additionally, China’s sense of a shifting balance of power has given it confi-
dence to correct what it considered a disadvantage. The shift in the two countries’ 
comparative economic strength left many in China with the belief that it no longer 
needs to appease Japan by treading carefully on the island dispute.94 Analysts and 
policymakers in China have increasingly spoken of Japan as a second-class power 
while China is on its way to becoming a first-class power.95 Some held the view 
that for many years China had been too conservative in shelving the dispute and 
had allowed Japan to solidify its control of the Diaoyu/Senkaku islands.96 According 
to a newspaper affiliated with the Communist Party of China, “the time that the 
Chinese nation could be bullied by anyone is gone forever and China now absolutely 
has the capabilities to safeguard its territorial sovereignty”.97 
Such factors could have motivated Chinese actions starting in 2008 to send 
occasional civilian law enforcement vessels to the disputed waters, and was cited as 
a reason for continued patrols far before Japan’s island purchase.98 A Marine 
Surveillance East China Sea fleet commander stated in March 2012 that China had 
to “demonstrate presence, show administration and declare sovereignty” by patrol-
ling near the islands in order to “foil Japan’s attempt to cement its claim through 
 
 
91 Another maritime scholar who advises the government said he and his colleagues “should 
thank Japan” for helping them get their policy proposals implemented. Crisis Group interviews, 
Beijing, August-October 2012, January 2013. 
92 Crisis Group interview, Beijing, October 2012. 
93 “专家称钓鱼岛被日’窃占’时效取得说法不成立”, 人民网 [“Experts said theory on Japan ‘stealing’ 
Diaoyu Islands through acquisition prescription does not stand up to scrutiny”, The People’s Daily 
(online)], 25 July 2012. This principle allows a state to acquire territory by exercising sovereignty 
or administering the area over a period of time, but it sets conditions, including acquiescence of 
other interested parties. Acquiescence can either be expressed or implied. Implied acquiescence 
can take many forms, but broadly it is seen as the failure of another state to protest the claimant 
state’s authority over the territory and the failure to refer the matter to the adequate international 
organisation or tribunal, such as the UN or the ICJ, within an appropriate period of time. See 
Surya P. Sharma, Territorial Acquisition, Disputes and (The Hague, 1997), pp. 108-111. 
94 According to an analyst with PLA ties, “before China had to look up to Japan but now China 
is at least Japan’s equal”. Crisis Group interview Beijing, October 2012.  
95 Crisis Group interview, Shanghai, December 2012. One scholar seemed to take some pleasure 
in Japan’s misfortune; noting that following the March 2011 Tohoku earthquake/tsunami and 
Fukushima nuclear disaster, there were thankfully far fewer Japan-related conferences and 
gatherings that year. Crisis Group interview, Beijing, November 2011. 
96 Crisis Group interview, Beijing, October 2012.  
97 钟声, “日本不要瞎折腾”, 人民日报 [Zhong Sheng, “Japan should stop making futile efforts”, 
The People’s Daily], 9 January 2013.  
98 That mission originated from the East China Sea division of the State Oceanic Administration, 
which commands the Marine Surveillance. “亲历者讲述巡航钓鱼岛：与日本船对抗航行”, 暸望
东方周刊 [“Eyewitness recounts Diaoyu Islands patrol: Confronting Japanese vessels”, Oriental 
Outlook Weekly], 18 September 2012. 
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establishing the so called ‘acquisition prescription’”.99 The Japanese purchase an-
nouncement offered China the opportunity to officially normalise such patrols and 
conduct them with regularity.  
China’s reactively assertive approach likely reflects its desire to take firm actions 
to defend its maritime claims while maintaining a policy of peaceful development. 
Beijing repeatedly stated that Japan was “fully responsible for all consequences”.100 
As a Chinese maritime researcher put it, “the series of measures that China has taken 
to defend its rights has been mostly reactive and responsive and was necessary to 
respond to violation of our maritime interests”.101  
C. A Maritime Power with Core Interests 
China’s firm approach reflects a larger strategy of shifting from a land-focused power 
in both economic development and defence terms to a maritime power, a key 
component of which is strengthening defence of maritime rights.102 The change of 
focus from landward to seaward security has led maritime security interests to 
become the most important part of China’s strategic rationale. Former President 
Hu Jintao and Premier Wen Jiabao both stressed the importance of China be-
coming a maritime power in their final speeches, in November 2012 and March 
2013 respectively.103 New leaders Xi Jinping and Li Keqiang have also reinforced 
the “maritime power” concept.104  
 
 
99 “中国海监称定期巡航将中断和打破日本对钓鱼岛的’时效取得’企图”, 东方早报 [“China Marine 
Surveillance said regular patrols will break Japan’s attempt to take Diaoyu Island through ‘acquisi-
tion prescription’”, Oriental Morning Post], 22 March 2012. 
100 “外交部副部长张志军就钓鱼岛问题举行媒体吹风会” [“Vice Foreign Minister Zhang Zhijun 
briefed Chinese and foreign journalists on the Diaoyu Dao issue (transcript)”], op. cit.  
101吴继陆, “正确认识海洋维权形式，坚决维护国家海洋权益”, 国家海洋局海洋发展战略研究所 
[Wu Jilu, “Correctly understand formats to safeguard maritime rights, firmly defend national 
maritime rights and interests”, China Institute for Marine Affairs], 20 November 2012. But 
some moderate analysts have voiced concerns over China’s unyielding approach, as it “enlarged 
the public’s appetite” for more and stronger steps to defend and cement maritime claims, mak-
ing diplomatic accommodation of Japan even less palatable. Crisis Group interview, Beijing, 
September 2012. 
102 Former President Hu Jintao first declared China “a maritime power” in a December 2006 
speech to the navy and urged it to become a “powerful navy that adapts to the needs of our mili-
tary’s historical mission in this new century and at this new stage”. “胡锦涛强调锻造适应历史使
命要求的强大人民海军”, 新华网 [“Hu Jintao stressed building a strong people’s navy to adapt to 
the requirements of historical mission”, Xinhua News Agency], 27 December 2006. China’s 
2006 White Paper on National Defence gave details on its intention of building a blue-water 
navy capable of operating far from its homeports, outlining goals such as “gradual extension of the 
strategic depth for offshore defensive operations” and building “mobile maritime troops”. “China’s 
National Defence in 2006”, Section IV, Information Office of the State Council of the People’s Re-
public of China, December 2006. Two other defence white papers reinforced such missions: “China’s 
National Defense in 2008”, Section V, 20 January 2009; and “China’s National Defense in 2010”, 
31 March 2011. 
103 “十八大在京开幕 胡锦涛作报告”, 财新网 [“Eighteenth party congress opened in Beijing, Hu 
Jintao delivered keynote report”, Caixin (online)], 8 November 2012. 
104 “Premier Li Keqiang said, “building a maritime power is a necessity to build a modernised 
country”. He also urged the Marine Surveillance to “resolutely safeguard the nation’s maritime 
rights”. “李克强慰问我国极地大洋科考队员和海监工作人员”, 新华社 [“Li Keqiang greeted mem-
bers of Chinese polar oceanic scientific expedition team and Maritime Surveillance staff”, Xinhua 
News Agency], 7 February 2013. President Xi Jinping spoke to the navy upon taking over control 
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Maritime agencies, coastal provinces and the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) 
have all considered the leadership’s initiative a licence to step up their own activities 
for ocean exploration, development and the defence of maritime rights and claims.105 
Alongside these developments, Beijing has expanded both Marine Surveillance and 
Fisheries agencies in order to strengthen routine patrols in disputed areas. In March 
2013, it began restructuring and consolidating its maritime agencies in order to focus 
its resources and enhance coordination. Beijing has also established the National 
Oceanic Commission “to formulate oceanic development strategies”.106 
Although never officially stated by the government, Chinese commentators and 
state media in recent years have started to refer to maritime rights as part of China’s 
“core interests (核心利益)”, namely those strategic interests on which China will 
not compromise and which it would possibly be ready to protect by force. The 
phrase, broadly defined to include state sovereignty, national security, territorial 
integrity and domestic stability, had traditionally only been applied to Taiwan, 
Tibet and Xinjiang.107 In his first foreign policy speech after becoming head of the 
communist party, Xi Jinping stated that China “will remain on a path of peaceful 
development”, but warned that “no country should presume that we will engage 
in trade involving our core interests”. A Chinese analyst interpreted this as a warning 
to countries that are challenging China’s maritime rights and interests.108 A few days 
later, a top-level PLA general warned that China’s “main security threat comes from 
the sea”, pledging “not the slightest harm can come to the core national interests”.109 
In recent years, foreign diplomats have said Chinese officials repeatedly referred 
to the South China Sea as part of China’s core interests, although Chinese researchers 
insist that Beijing has not made a policy decision to do so.110 
 
 
of the communist party and the army, and urged it to focus on “the dream of a strong nation, 
which… is the dream for a strong military”. “习近平考察广州战区谈 ’强国梦’ ‘强军梦’”, 新华社 
[“Xi Jinping visited Guangzhou military region, spoke of ‘strong nation dream’ and ‘strong military 
dream’”，Xinhua News Agency], 13 December 2012. 
105 “十八大首提海洋强国 海南将加快建设海洋强省”，海南日报 [“Maritime power concept first 
mentioned in eighteenth party congress, Hainan will boost development into a maritime prov-
ince”, Hainan Daily]，12 November 2012; “国家海洋局与海军双方研讨相互合作建设海洋强国”, 中
国新闻网 [“State Oceanic Bureau and navy discussed cooperation to build maritime pow-
er”, Chinanews.net], 20 February 2013; “争当建设海洋强国主力省”, 广州日报 [“Strive to be 
main force in building maritime power”, Guangzhou Daily]，23 February 2013;“国家海洋局党
组对建设海洋强国进行研讨”, 中国海洋报 [“Party committee of State Oceanic Administration 
held seminar on building maritime power”, China Ocean News], 2 March 2013; “解放军代表呼
吁尽快出台海洋法为’海洋强国’做支撑”，中国广播网 [“PLA delegate calling for ocean law in 
support of ‘maritime power’”, cnr.cn], 7 March 2013. 
106 “China to restructure oceanic administration, enhance maritime law enforcement”, Xinhua 
News Agency, 10 March 2013. See Sections V.D. “Maritime Agencies in Ascendance.  
107 Core interests were defined by the State Council as: state sovereignty, national security, ter-
ritorial integrity and national reunification, the political system established by the constitution 
and overall social stability, and the basic safeguards for ensuring sustainable economic and so-
cial development. “China’s Peaceful Development”, State Council White Paper, 6 September 
2011. See also Wang Jisi, “China’s Search for a Grand Strategy”, Foreign Affairs, March/April 
2011, p. 2; and Michael D. Swaine, “China’s Assertive Behavior, Part One: on ‘Core Interests’”, 
China Leadership Monitor, no. 34 (Winter 2011), p. 2. 
108 “Xi vows no surrender on ‘legitimate rights, core interests”, The China Daily, 30 January 2013.  
109 “戚建国：国家核心利益不能损, 主权不能丢，领土不能少”［Qi Jiangguo: national core inter-
ests cannot be harmed, national sovereignty cannot be lost, territory cannot be compromised], 
Chinese defence ministry, 4 February 2013.  
110 See Crisis Group Report, Stirring up the South China Sea (I), op. cit., pp. 4. 
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The government has avoided directly labelling the Diaoyu/Senkaku dispute an 
issue that involves its core interests, but the linkage is apparent. Such a connection 
was made for the first time by a January 2012 editorial in the government’s mouth-
piece, The People’s Daily.111 In October that year, when asked whether core interests 
apply to Diaoyu/Senkaku, Chinese Vice Foreign Minister Zhang Zhijun did not 
deny or confirm, and instead recited the definition of the phrase, repeated that 
those islands are Chinese territories and warned Japan “not to doubt, let alone to 
test” China’s resolve to defend them.112  
D. Nationalism: A Double-edged Sword 
Nationalism makes sovereignty in the East China Sea a highly explosive issue, as 
sentiments over the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands run deeper in the Chinese psyche than 
any other territorial dispute in modern Chinese history, with the exception of Taiwan. 
Anti-Japanese sentiment in China is a legacy of the Japanese invasion during the 
Second World War and has been reinforced by decades of government-driven 
patriotic education and mass media recounting Japan’s brutal occupation and 
China’s heroic triumph under the CCP’s leadership. Beijing further weaves the 
Diaoyu/Senkaku issue into the historical narrative of Japan’s refusal to repent for 
its past aggression.113 This has ensured that more than 60 years after the war, the 
enmity of the past remains alive in today’s younger generations.114 A “feedback 
loop” has ensued whereby history education has stimulated the growth of national-
ism, which in turn provides a larger market for nationalistic messages.115 According 
to a Chinese scholar, “the main theme of Chinese nationalism is anti-Japan”.116  
Meanwhile, the rapid rise of Internet use and social media over the past decade 
has eroded Beijing’s control over popular sentiments and begun to influence poli-
cymaking.117 Internet users now track Chinese law enforcement vessels via satellite 
photos, mocking and criticising the government when they stop short of disputed 
waters, holding Beijing accountable to act in line with statements made during 
times of high public pressure.118 The baseline announcement, for example, created 
expectations that China would take steps to assert sovereignty over the islands while 
 
 
111 “China will not tolerate test of its will to safeguard sovereignty”, The People’s Daily, 18 Janu-
ary 2012.  
112 “外交部副部长张志军就钓鱼岛问题举行媒体吹风会” [“Vice Foreign Minister Zhang Zhijun 
briefed Chinese and foreign journalists on the Diaoyu Dao Issue (transcript)”], op. cit.  
113 According to Zheng Wang, the CCP “has used history education as an instrument for the glorifi-
cation of the party, for the consolidation of national identity, and for the justification of the politi-
cal system of the CCP’s one-party rule in the post-Tiananmen and post-Cold War eras”. Zheng 
Wang, Never Forget National Humiliation (New York, 2012), p. 8. See also Ming Wan, Sino-
Japanese Relations: Interaction, Logic, and Transformation (Washington DC, 2006), p. 150. 
Chinese Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi denounced Japan’s claim over the islands as “an outright 
denial of the outcomes of the victory of the World Anti-Fascist War [that] constitutes a grave chal-
lenge to the post-war international order”. “Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi refutes Japan’s distorted 
accounts on Diaoyu Dao issue at the Asia-Europe meeting summit”, press release, Chinese foreign 
ministry, 6 November 2012.  
114 Zheng Wang, op. cit., pp. 209-210. 
115 Ibid, p. 204. 
116 Crisis Group interview, Beijing, August 2012. 
117 Crisis Group interviews, Beijing, August-September 2012.  
118 Stephanie Kleine-Ahlbrandt, “China and Japan’s simmering island row is threatening to boil 
over”, The Guardian, 20 August 2012. 
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pushing Japan out. After the announcement and before Marine Surveillance ships 
arrived near the islands, netizens questioned the government’s resolve and mocked 
the Marine Surveillance for acting cowardly.119 A netizen summed it up: Beijing 
“can’t just verbally draw [the territorial sea baselines], then neglect them. That’s 
humiliating”.120  
This in turn emboldens belligerent voices and constricts the space for diplomacy. 
Some current and former PLA officers regularly give vent to hardline rhetoric that 
borders on warmongering.121 Internet users have gone so far as to ask for military 
intervention. Online posts refer to the foreign ministry as “Mai Guo Bu (卖国部)”, 
“the ministry of traitors” – for calling for Japan to return to negotiations.122 Chinese 
analysts said such statements do not represent the leadership’s thinking, but are 
nevertheless allowed as “they are motivated by patriotism and not in violation of 
national principles”.123  
But the government takes measures to quickly curtail such expression as soon 
as it turns into criticism of its domestic policy. During the anti-Japan demonstra-
tions that erupted across China in mid-September 2012, protesters held signs de-
nouncing the government’s record on food safety and land-grabbing by officials and 
calling for “corrupt officials” to be sent to defend the islands.124 A Chinese analyst 
explained that the government had been under criticism for being “too hard on its 
own people and too soft facing outside”, and therefore “wouldn’t be able to answer 
to the public” had it not responded firmly to “Japan’s provocation”.125 The New 
Left – a loose collection of officials, activists and intellectuals that broadly advocates 
 
 
119 A post on Weibo (the Chinese equivalent of Twitter) cited Japanese media saying the Marine 
Surveillance vessels were not near the islands. It was reposted more than 15,000 times, and 
some comments mocked the ships as “submarines” or being equipped with “invisibility technol-
ogy”. Weibo post by @头条新闻 [Toutiaoxinwen], 9:12pm, 12 September 2012; and Weibo re-
sponses by @丛林－部落 [Conglin-buluo], 2:27pm, 16 September 2012 and @金风雨露－相逢
521, [Jinfengyuluyixiangfeng521], 12:42am, 23 September 2012. http://weibo.com/1618051664/ 
yBzrw3FsY.  
120 “紧急呼叫：海监 46、49 您们在哪里？听到请回答！”, 天涯社区 [“Emergency call: Marine 
Surveillance 46, 49 where are you? Answer if you hear us!”, Tianya.cn]，12 September 2012. 
Explaining the potency of popular online sentiment, a former high-level Chinese official said, 
“once [the government] hears common folks criticising our foreign policy as being soft, they 
want to harden it”. Crisis Group interview, Beijing, August 2012. 
121 For example, responding to media reports that Japan might consider firing tracer shots to 
warn off Chinese flights approaching Diaoyu/Senkaku, PLA General Peng Guangqian said that 
action would be considered Japan “firing the first shot” and would mark the beginning of “a real 
war”. “彭光谦：日方若发射曳光弹就是’打第一枪”, 人民网 [“Peng Guangqian: If Japan fires trac-
er shot, that would count as ‘firing the first shot’”, The People’s Daily (online)], 14 January 
2012. A commentary piece on the PLA-affiliated China Military Online admonished soldiers to 
prepare for war, saying, “the confrontation between China and Japan… has escalated from the 
original air force mutual monitoring over the waters around Diaoyu Islands to the verge of war”. 
“Commentary: Soldiers should prepare for war”, China Military Online, 17 January 2013. 
122 This happened, for example, when a Chinese foreign ministry spokesman in October 2012 
urged Japan to acknowledge the disputed status of the islands and return to negotiations. 中华
论坛  [Zhonghua BBS], http://club.china.com/data/thread/1011/2747/71/14/5_1.html. 天涯 
[Tianya BBS], www.tianya.cn/publicforum/content/worldlook/1/593049.shtml.空军网 [Kongjun 
Wang], www.ikongjun.com/s/diaoyudao//2012/1013/39400.html. 
123 Crisis Group interview, Beijing, February 2013. 
124 “图看反日游行中的标语”, 共识网 [“Pictures of slogans in anti-Japanese protests”, 21ccom.net], 
20 September 2012. 
125 Crisis Group interview, Beijing, September 2012. 
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a return to Maoism and a stronger role for the state in the economy – utilised the 
protests to rally support for their cause and fuel opposition to the government.126  
The government rapidly shut down the protests and restored order within a 
day.127 If the central leadership were to adopt a clear and moderate policy, it could 
certainly take measures to sensitise the public to the need for such an approach and 
help dampen nationalist sentiment. The fact that it has done the opposite suggests 
it prefers to fan nationalism to justify assertive actions and convince its adversary 
that it cannot back down. It took until March 2013 for Beijing to make an effort to 
tone down harsh rhetoric against Japan.128  
 
 
126 On 18 September 2012, hundreds of farmers appeared in Beijing alongside self-proclaimed 
“revolutionary leftist” intellectual Han Deqiang carrying Mao portraits and shouting anti-
Japanese slogans. In Chengdu, protesters called for the return of recently purged leftist icon Bo 
Xilai; and prominent leftist blogger and university professor Zhang Hongliang wrote, “the con-
ditions are now right for a large-scale movement to eliminate traitors”. “China government’s 
hand seen in protests”, Los Angeles Times, 20 September 2012.  
127 On 15-16 September, anti-Japan demonstrations erupted across China and turned into van-
dalising and looting in many cities. A People’s Daily front-page editorial on 17 September 
praised the patriotic passion of the demonstrators and urged them to “observe civility and the 
rule of law”. The same day, other official media outlets followed with their own editorials criti-
cising the violence and calling for calm. On 18 September, the 81st anniversary of the Mukden 
incident (that led to the Japanese invasion of China in 1931), anti-Japan protests again took 
place in many Chinese cities, including a demonstration outside the Japanese embassy in Bei-
jing, but this later round was much more orderly and controlled. “多地反日游行现暴力官方媒体
纷纷呼吁理性”, 财新网 [“Anti-Japanese protests turned violent in several cities, official media 
appealed for rationality”, Caixin (online)], 17 September 2012. “用文明法治凝聚爱国力量”, 人民
日报 [“Using civilisation and law to gather patriotic strength”, The People’s Daily], 17 Septem-
ber 2012; “多家媒体发表评论呼吁爱国要理性”, 财新网 [“Multiple media outlets publish com-
mentaries urging for rational expression of patriotism", Caixin (online)], 17 September 2012; 
“Fresh anti-Japanese protests in China on symbolic anniversary”, CNN, 19 September 2012. 
128 See Section V.A.1 “Challenges of Japan policymaking in China”.  
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IV. Japan’s Equation  
Understanding Japan’s perspective on the current crisis requires examination of 
the diplomatic row following the 7 September 2010 incident, also referred to as 
the “Senkaku shock” in Japan, when a Chinese trawler captain rammed two JCG 
vessels in disputed waters.129 The captain was subsequently detained and charged 
under Japanese domestic law.130 According to a Japanese analyst, this led to “a com-
bination of unfortunate elements” causing the largest crisis in bilateral relations 
since the 2005 anti-Japan protests across China.131 Beijing’s demand for the im-
mediate release of the boat captain, his crew and the trawler went unmet.132 After 
releasing the crew and the boat on 13 September, Japan kept the captain and then 
prolonged his detention by nine days on 20 September.133 
The episode appeared to be a departure from the way Japan had handled Chinese 
civilians who travelled to the disputed islands. In those cases, such as the March 
2004 landing incident, Japan arrested the individuals and deported them without 
charge, allowing tensions to dissipate more quickly.134 In those previous incidents, 
Chinese activists who tried to force their way onto the islands were processed under 
the immigration law.135 The 2010 boat collision involved a higher-level violation 
under Japan’s criminal code for “obstruction of public duties of an officer of the 
law”.136 Some Japanese analysts said it was a mistake for the three-month-old Naoto 
Kan government to allow legal procedures to play out a long course rather than 
treat the boat collision as a diplomatic incident and step in to manage it.137 They said 
 
 
129 Crisis Group interview, Tokyo, October 2012. 
130 For more information, see Sheila A. Smith, “Japan and the East China Dispute”, Foreign Policy 
Research Institute (Summer 2012), p. 374. 
131 Crisis Group interviews, Tokyo, October 2012; Beijing, January 2013. The 2005 riots oc-
curred after the Japanese education ministry approved a new junior high school textbook which, 
according to critics, provided a distorted account of Japan’s colonial and wartime activities. 
Protests broke out in more than ten Chinese cities, the largest anti-Japanese demonstrations 
since the normalisation of diplomatic relations in 1972. Zheng Wang, op. cit., p. 204.  
132 The Chinese foreign ministry apparently called in the Japanese ambassador at 3am on the 
night of the incident. Crisis Group interview, Beijing, November 2010. Chinese Foreign Minister 
Yang Jiechi first publicly demanded that Japan “unconditionally release and return the entire 
crew of the fishing boat, including the captain” on 10 September. “China-Japan sea dispute es-
calates as Beijing demands fisherman’s release”, Reuters, 10 September 2010.  
133 “Japan frees Chinese fishing crew”, BBC News, 13 September 2010; “Japan extends China 
ship captain detention”, Reuters, 20 September 2010. Chinese diplomats who arrived from Tokyo 
reportedly advised the skipper to remain silent, which prolonged the detention. Crisis Group 
interviews, Tokyo, October 2013. 
134 Seven Chinese activists landed on the islands in March 2004 and were arrested. The Chinese 
foreign ministry protested, and Japan deported them without charge. Reinhard Drifte, op. cit., p. 17.  
135 Those activists were normally arrested and deported without charge under Article 65 of the 
Immigration Control and Refugee Recognition Law. This article only applies if there are no other 
charges (such as obstruction). “Immigration Control and Refugee Recognition Act (Cabinet Order 
No. 319 of 1951)”. 
136 According to a high-level JCG official, the arrest was due to the extreme nature of the act – an 
aggressive and deliberate ramming of two JCG vessels – which caught the officers on duty “com-
pletely off-guard”. Crisis Group interview, Tokyo, October 2012. Under Japanese law, a person 
who commits an act of assault or intimidation against a public officer can be charged with obstruc-
tion. Penal Code (Act No. 45 of 1907), Chapter 5: Crimes of Obstruction of Performance of Public 
Duty, Article 95 (Obstructing or Compelling Performance of Public Duty), effective 28 May 2006. 
137 Crisis Group interviews, Tokyo, October 2012. 
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such a blunder permitted a wider crisis, with one of them saying that the inexpe-
rienced government should have flashed a “new driver on board” sign.138 According 
to a prominent Japanese expert, “the poor handling of this situation contributed to 
the DPJ’s image of ineptness on foreign policy, particularly with regard to China”.139  
Beijing interpreted Japan’s reaction as a breach of the precedent of “capture and 
release” that had helped limit the impact of individual activist activity on bilateral 
relations, and struck back with a string of punitive measures.140 These included the 
suspension of bilateral exchanges at the provincial and ministerial level, mass can-
cellations of trips to Japan by Chinese tourists and allowing protests in front of 
Japanese diplomatic missions and schools.141 On 21 September, China reportedly 
suspended shipments of rare earth metals essential for Japanese high-tech industries. 
The embargo lasted approximately two months.142 Beijing denied official involve-
ment, but many Japanese analysts remain convinced that the Chinese government 
had tailored the export restriction to punish Japan.143 Many Japanese were extremely 
shocked by the rare earths ban, particularly given previous practice of insulating 
the bilateral economic relationship from political tensions, a situation both sides 
referred to as “hot economics, cold politics”.144 On 23 September, China arrested 
four Japanese for entering a military zone without authorisation.145  
The next day, Japanese officials announced that the government had decided to 
release the Chinese skipper.146 Even after this, China demanded apologies and mone-
tary compensation, which became an additional sore point in a Japan already reeling 
from having yielded under Chinese pressure.147 This incident came on the heels of the 
announcement in August 2010 that China overtook Japan as the world’s second 
largest economy, leading some in Japan to refer to 2010 as the year of the “China 
shock”.148 Beijing’s tough response to the incident caused a spike in antipathy among 
 
 
138 Ibid. 
139 Crisis Group email correspondence, March 2013. 
140 Crisis Group interviews, Beijing, August, September 2012; Tokyo, October 2012.  
141 The exchanges included talks aimed at expanding aviation routes and cooperation on coal. 
“Arrest in disputed seas riles China and Japan”, The New York Times, 19 September 2010. 
142 “China is blocking minerals, executives say”, The New York Times, 23 September 2010. The 
Japanese economy, trade and industry ministry first reported that shipments of rare materials 
to Japan were being stalled in customs. “China’s slower customs clearance seen as sanctions 
step vs. Japan”, Kyodo News, 19 September 2010; “China rare earth shipments back in works”, 
The Japan Times, 20 November 2010;  
143 “No ‘embargo’ of rare earths on Japanese firms”, The China Daily, 30 October 2010. Crisis 
Group interviews, Tokyo, October 2012.  
144 Crisis Group interviews, Tokyo, October 2012; Beijing, December 2012. 
145 “4 Japanese probed for illegally videotaping military targets”, The China Daily, 23 September 
2010.  
146 “Japan frees Chinese boat captain amid diplomatic row”, BBC, 24 September 2012. 
147 Crisis Group interview, Tokyo, October 2012. “FM spokesman: China reiterates demands for 
Japan’s apology, compensation for seizure of trawler”, The People’s Daily, 26 September 2010. 
Japan, in turn, asked China to pay compensation for the damage to the JCG vessels. Sheila A. 
Smith, op. cit., p. 374. 
148 The media first began reporting in August 2010 that China overtook Japan to become the 
world’s second largest economy and it became official in February 2011. “China passes Japan as 
second-largest economy”, The New York Times, 15 August 2010; “China unseats Japan as world 
No. 2 economy/ Late-year downturn was tipping point”, The Yomiuri Shimbun, 15 February 
2011; “Japan’s Security Strategy Toward China: Integration, Balancing, and Deterrence in the 
Era of the Power Shift”, The Tokyo Foundation policy proposal (October 2011), p. 43.  
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the Japanese public towards China. Several surveys in Japan in the following years 
confirmed this trend, with half of those who expressed an unfavourable view in June 
2012 citing the island dispute as the main cause.149  
The release of the captain also left many Japanese feeling humiliated and deep-
ened their disappointment with the leadership. According to a Japanese scholar, 
“we lost face in a big way”.150 A Yomiuri Shimbun survey in October 2012 found 
nearly half of respondents thought the decision gave “the impression Japan will 
back down if pressure is applied”.151 The souring public sentiment left a deep im-
pression on the DPJ government, which subsequently was on the defensive from 
attacks by right-wingers, especially Tokyo Governor Ishihara.152  
Public demand in Japan grew for the government to strengthen control and 
defence of the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands. A Japanese analyst said the public feared 
that the next incident could involve “100 [Chinese] fishermen and we can’t stop them, 
so we have to solidify our claim”.153 Another said the Japanese were worried that 
“if China takes over Senkaku, the next would be Okinawa”.154 Such sentiment was 
shared in some corners of the diplomatic community in Japan, who felt that “as 
China rose, we couldn’t just be nice”.155 Amid such domestic pressure, the Japa-
nese government in January 2012 named some of the disputed islands, which re-
sulted in protests from Beijing and The People’s Daily labelling the islands one of 
China’s “core interests”.156 Growing public appetite for the government to better 
safeguard the islands provided a receptive audience for Ishihara.157 
 
 
149 “Public opinion of China slumps/after Senkaku Islands incident, record-high 84% don’t trust 
country”, Yomiuri Shimbun, 5 October 2010. A June 2012 survey found that 84 per cent had an 
unfavourable opinion of China, surpassing the previous record of 78.3 per cent in 2011. The survey 
was conducted in Japan by door-to-door polling of 18 or older residents between 26 April-14 May 
with a total of 1,000 valid responses, and was supplemented with a separate questionnaire for cor-
porate executives, academics, media people, government officials and others with 600 valid re-
sponses. It was conducted as a part of an annual joint survey by The Genron NPO, a Japanese non-
profit organisation, and The China Daily newspaper. “Half of Chinese foresee military dispute 
with Japan, Genron NPO opinion poll shows”, The Genron NPO, 28 June 2012.  
150 Crisis Group interview, Tokyo, October 2012. 
151 72 per cent of the 1,104 respondents thought that the decision to release the captain was in-
appropriate. “Yomiuri Shimbun October 2010 telephone opinion poll”, Yomiuri Opinion Poll, 
Mansfield Asian Opinion Poll Database, 1-3 October 2010.  
152 Crisis Group interview, Tokyo, October 2012. 
153 Crisis Group interview, Beijing, October 2012.  
154 Crisis Group interview, Beijing, September 2012. Some hardliners in China claim that Oki-
nawa does not belong to Japan and was a vassal state of China. See for example, “罗援：琉球群
岛不属于日本曾是中国藩属国”, 环球时报 [“Luoyuan: Okinawa does not belong to Japan but was 
a vassal state of China”, The Global Times], 26 July 2012. 
155 Crisis Group interview, Tokyo, October 2012.  
156 “Japan to name islets in disputed area”, Associated Press, 16 January 2012; “China will not tol-
erate test of its will to safeguard sovereignty”, The People’s Daily, 18 January 2012. It was the first 
time the term “core interests” was officially applied to these islands. China also responded by nam-
ing the affiliated islets itself. “国家海洋局公布钓鱼岛及其部分附属岛屿标准名称”, 中国新闻网 
[“State Oceanic Administration announces official names for Diaoyu Islands and some affiliated 
islets”, Chinanews.com], 3 March 2012. 
157 Crisis Group interviews, Beijing, August 2012; Tokyo, October 2012.  
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V. The U.S. Factor as Seen by Tokyo and Beijing 
The U.S. has consistently asserted that the 1960 U.S.-Japan security treaty covers 
the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands.158 But both Japan and China project their own fears 
and hopes onto whether and how the U.S. would fulfil its treaty obligation. China’s 
incremental escalation of the island dispute sowed fear in Tokyo that Beijing was 
aiming to test and expose the limits of the U.S.-Japan alliance.159 Japanese officials 
and strategists expressed overall confidence in the U.S. commitment to the defence 
of the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands.160 But some voiced unease over a perceived delay 
by the Obama administration to reiterate that the treaty covered the islands, as well 
as an understanding that the U.S. would only come to Japan’s defence “after the 
Self-Defence Force was bloodied”.161 They also expressed a desire for the U.S. to 
explicitly endorse Japan’s sovereignty claim over the islands.162 As the dispute wore 
on, some in both Tokyo and Washington became concerned about the possibility 
that China’s game plan was to “provoke Japan to overreact; to make the U.S. 
nervous about Japan’s overreaction; to generate insecurity within Japan regarding 
the U.S.; thus weakening U.S.-Japan solidarity”.163 
Many Chinese strategists believe that the U.S.-Japan security alliance is the larg-
est obstacle to taking over the islands by force.164 However, some of them have been 
searching for signs of strain in the alliance as well as ambiguity that China could 
exploit in Article V of the treaty, which states that the security alliance applies to 
“territories under the administration of Japan”.165 Some analysts questioned whether 
the treaty would apply if China successfully established overlapping administration, 
since they would no longer unquestionably be under Japanese control – a notion 
which the U.S. has taken steps to dispel.166 Some analysts also wondered if the U.S. 
 
 
158	Since 1972, U.S. administrations have not taken a position on the sovereignty of the islands, but 
have considered that the treaty covers the islets and that Japan administers the Senkakus/Diaoyu 
Islands. Under the treaty, the U.S. guarantees Japan’s security in return for the right to station 
U.S. troops – which currently number around 50,000 – in dozens of bases throughout the Jap-
anese archipelago. Although it is commonly understood that Japan will assume the primary de-
fence responsibility, in the event of a significant armed conflict with either China or Taiwan, 
most Japanese would likely expect the U.S. to honour its treaty obligations. Mark E. Manyin, 
“Senkaku (Diaoyu/Diaoyutai) Island Dispute: U.S. Treaty Obligations”, Congressional Research 
Service, 22 January 2013. 
159	Crisis Group email correspondence, March 2013. 
160	Crisis Group interviews, Tokyo, October 2012. 
161	Japanese officials felt the U.S. was “too nice” to China in the first two years of the Obama ad-
ministration and unhappy it took until 2010 for then-Secretary of State Hillary Clinton to 
acknowledge the security treaty covers the islands. Crisis Group interviews, Tokyo, October 2012. 
162	Crisis Group interviews, Tokyo, October 2012.  
163	Crisis Group email correspondence, March 2013.  
164	Crisis Group interviews, Beijing, January and February 2013. 
165	Crisis Group interviews, Beijing, January and February 2013. “Treaty of Mutual Cooperation 
and Security Between Japan and the United States of America”, Article V, 19 January 1960. 
166	Crisis Group interviews, Beijing, January and February 2013. In December 2012, the U.S. 
Senate passed an amendment to the National Defence Authorization Act, stating, “The unilat-
eral actions of a third party will not affect United States acknowledgement of the administration 
of Japan over the Senkaku Islands”. U.S. President Obama signed it into law in January. “Na-
tional Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2013”, Subtitle F. SEC 1286 (4). Also in Janu-
ary, then-Secretary of State Hillary Clinton stated, “we oppose any unilateral actions that would 
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would only nominally fulfil its treaty obligation in the event of a conflict by 
providing Japan weapons rather than soldiers and fleets.167 After Abe’s visit to 
Washington – during which he declared, “no one should ever doubt the robustness 
of the Japan-U.S. Alliance”, Chinese state media and commentators asserted that 
Obama had given Abe a “cold shoulder”, as he did not specifically mention the island 
issue.168 
Harder-line analysts in China assert that Washington has encouraged Japan 
to stir up trouble in order to facilitate the U.S. rebalancing to Asia, which many 
Chinese are convinced is aimed at containing China.169 Even moderates hold the 
view that the growing presence of the U.S. in the region has at least emboldened 
Japan.170 Due to the belief that Japan is being used in a broader geopolitical strategy 
by the U.S. to encircle China, many in Beijing were less willing to give importance 
to internal Japanese politics as the reason that led the government to purchase 
the islands. 171 The tendency by Chinese policymakers and the state media to see 
foreign policy issues through the lens of a U.S.-China strategic struggle inhibits 
accurate analysis of underlying issues and irritates countries that do not feel treated 
as an equal player by China.  
 
 
 
seek to undermine Japanese administration”. “Remarks with the Japanese Foreign Minister 
Fumio Kishida after their meeting”, press release, U.S. State Department, 18 January 2013. 
167	Crisis Group interviews, Beijing, September, November 2012, January 2013.  
168	“‘Japan is Back’ Policy Speech by Prime Minister Shinzo Abe at the Center for Strategic and 
International Studies (CSIS)”, Japanese cabinet office, 22 February 2013. “安倍访美受冷遇 钓鱼
岛问题奥巴马只字未提”, 人民日报［”Abe was given cold shoulder during visit to the U.S.; 
Obama did not say a word about Diaoyu Islands”, The People’s Daily], 24 February 2013.  
169	“钓鱼岛争端是美国战略重点东移的必然”, 国家智库 [“Diaoyu Islands dispute was an inevitable 
result of the U.S. eastward strategic pivot”, National Think Tank], 27 September 2012. Crisis Group 
interviews, Beijing, August-November 2012. 
170	Crisis Group interviews, Beijing, September-November 2012. 
171	Crisis Group interviews, Beijing, September-November 2012; January 2013. 
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VI. Weakening Crisis Mitigation 
Forty years of Sino-Japanese diplomatic relations have been dotted with disputes. 
While managing frequent, inevitable frictions, the two sides had developed a “ritual-
ized” system that had prevented minor crises from spinning out of control.172 Top 
leaders were setting the overall tone for peace and friendship, with dedicated 
high-level officials negotiating behind the scenes and diplomats providing expertise 
and logistical support. In recent years, however, this personality-driven system 
started to disintegrate, beginning from the very top. Attempts to forge more stable 
institutional linkages have largely failed. China’s increased naval presence in the 
East China Sea and the contest for administration of the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands 
have expanded risks for frictions into new frontlines that involve more hardline 
actors, making future crisis management even more challenging. These factors have 
taken place in the context of the shifting balance of power between China and Japan. 
A. Leadership 
1. Challenges of Japan policymaking in China 
Due to the countries’ fraught history, advocating for improved ties with Japan in 
China has always carried political risk. Strong leaders have had the most success. 
The normalisation of diplomatic ties in 1972 was led by Mao Zedong, who enjoyed 
a status akin to a deity. It was implemented under the close supervision of the 
People’s Republic of China’s first Premier Zhou Enlai.173 This decision followed the 
deterioration of ties with Moscow and China’s need for financial and economic assis-
tance from Japan. Top Chinese leaders carefully prepared propaganda guidelines, 
arguing, for example, that strengthening relations with Japan was “a beneficial 
move to contain U.S. imperialism and to strike against the Soviet Union”.174  
Deng Xiaoping, another revolutionary leader who ruled the country from 1978 
to 1989, presided over the negotiations leading to, and the signing of, the Treaty 
of Peace and Friendship with Japan in 1978, ushering in an era of booming trade, 
economic and cultural exchanges.175 Deng knew well that China needed Japan’s 
intellectual capital and investment for his opening and reform policy to succeed. 
 
 
172	Richard C. Bush, The Perils of Proximity: China-Japan Security Relations (Washington DC, 
2010), pp. 15-16. 
173	Leaders and Japan specialists in Mao’s and Deng’s time were revolutionary elders, founding 
fathers of the People’s Republic of China and heroes who fought Japan in the Second World 
War. This, according to Chinese analysts, helped them reinforce ties with Japan without being 
accused of selling out national interests to a former enemy. Crisis Group interviews, Beijing, 
August, September 2012. 
174	Ahead of then-Japanese Prime Minister Kakuei Tanaka’s visit to Beijing, the foreign ministry 
issued “The Guidelines of Internal Propaganda Concerning Japanese Prime Minister Visit to 
China”. It stated that China’s suffering under the brutality of Japanese militarists could make it 
hard for many Chinese to understand why Beijing would invite Tanaka and argued that “the 
time had changed, and so did the world. Currently, the greatest threat to our country is the U.S. 
imperialism and the Soviet revisionism, especially the latter”. Xuanli Liao, Chinese Foreign Policy 
Think Tanks and China’s Policy Towards Japan (Hong Kong, 2006), pp. 143-145. 
175	He is officially described as the “core” of the second generation of Chinese leaders, after Mao, 
and continued to wield enormous political power in the first half of the 1990s after his retirement. 
“邓小平”,新华资料 [“Deng Xiaoping”, Xinhua Archives]，http://news.xinhuanet.com/ziliao/2003 
-01/17/content_694863.htm. Erza F. Vogel, “China under Deng Xiaoping’s leadership”, East 
Asia Forum, 27 September 2011.  
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During his visit to Japan in 1978, he said that China and Japan should set aside 
the Diaoyu/Senkaku issue and leave it to a future and smarter generation to solve.176 
“Shelving the dispute” thus became the guiding principle for managing maritime 
sovereignty issues for generations of Chinese leaders and diplomats until recent years. 
Deng’s successors had less success in maintaining good Sino-Japanese relations. 
When Hu Yaobang tried to enhance ties between the two countries, he came under 
severe criticism from conservatives, particularly for inviting 3,000 Japanese youths 
to visit China and entertaining Japanese Prime Minister Nakasone and his family 
in his home when they visited China.177 Hu lost power in a factional struggle, and 
his attempts to improve relations with Japan were used among other alleged mis-
deeds to justify his removal from office. While his downfall was primarily due to a 
conservative backlash against his efforts toward political reform, Chinese leaders 
and diplomats also read it as a cautionary tale on reaching out to Japan.178  
Relations with Japan began to seriously deteriorate in the 1990s during the 
rule of Jiang Zemin. He launched a patriotic propaganda campaign centred on 
China’s suffering under and eventual triumph over Japan during the Second World 
War.179 In a speech in front of the Japanese emperor in November 1998, Jiang 
brought up Japanese militarism and “reemphasize[d] historical issues” between 
the two sides, only aggravating bilateral tensions.180 Many Chinese scholars think 
that Jiang’s childhood memory of family suffering and sacrifice during the Japanese 
invasion motivated this campaign.181 Japanese and Western scholars, however, 
believe that the real driver was his desire to cement his power in the ideological 
void left after the 1989 Tian’anmen events, when the CCP’s legitimacy was under 
severe strain.182  
Following Jiang, President Hu Jintao had a mixed record in attempting to en-
hance relations with Japan. He was able to overcome internal disagreement to reach 
a deal with Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, who privately promised not to visit 
the Yasukuni Shrine in exchange for a resumption of high-level summits.183 Abe 
 
 
176	“搁置争议，共同开发 [Shelve dispute, seek joint development]”, Chinese foreign ministry, 
www.mfa.gov.cn/chn//gxh/xsb/wjzs/t8958.htm. 
177	During his 1983 state visit to Japan, he addressed a joint session of the Diet (parliament) and 
visited the Nagasaki Peace Park, laying a wreath at a memorial to Nagasaki citizens killed by the 
atomic bomb. He organised trips for young Japanese guests to tour several Chinese cities in 
1984 when Beijing celebrated the twelfth anniversary of Sino-Japanese relations. The conserva-
tives attacked this move as being extravagant because Japan only hosted 500 Chinese youths 
the previous year. Khoon Choy Lee, “Pioneers of Modern China: Understanding the Inscrutable 
Chinese” (Singapore, 2005), pp. 312-313. See also Susan Shirk, op. cit., p. 163.  
178	Hu Yaobang’s downfall was given six reasons. Ezra Vogel, Deng Xiaoping and the Trans-
formation of China (Cambridge, Massachusetts, 2011), p. 584; Susan Shirk, op. cit., p. 163. 
179	Ibid and Crisis Group interviews, Beijing, September, October 2012; Tokyo, October 2012.  
180	Masahiko Sasajima, “Japan’s Domestic Politics and China Policymaking”, in Benjamin L. 
Self and Jeffrey W. Thompson (eds.), An Alliance for Engagement: Building Cooperation in 
Security Relations with China (Washington DC, 2002), p. 81. 
181	Susan Shirk, op. cit., pp. 164-165; Ming Wan, op. cit., pp. 144-145.  
182	Crisis Group interviews, Tokyo, October 2012. See also Susan Shirk, op. cit., pp. 164-165. A 
Chinese analyst ascribed Jiang’s more muscular approach to an allegation that his biological 
father had been accused of collaborating with the Japanese, a fact denied by the family. Crisis 
Group interview, Beijing, January 2013. “High stakes in China’s game of throne”, The Sydney 
Morning Herald, 17 November 2012.  
183	The Yasukuni Shrine commemorates those who died for the Japanese empire, including 
fourteen Class-A war criminals from the Second World War. It also houses a museum dedicated 
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led an “ice-breaking” trip to Beijing in 2006, ending a five-year freeze of summit 
exchanges.184 Subsequently, Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao led an “ice-melting trip” 
to Tokyo in 2007, followed by a “warm-spring trip” by Hu Jintao to Japan in 2008.185 
But one of Hu’s and Wen’s signature endeavours – to begin jointly developing oil and 
gas resources with Japan in the East China Sea – was halted after two years of nego-
tiation due to domestic opposition.186 By the time Hu and Wen left power, Sino-
Japanese tensions had entered another downturn due to the 2010 and 2012 crises. 
The challenges Hu encountered in sustaining good relations with Japan partly 
had to do with the transition of the Chinese governance model from the strong 
individual to a collective leadership, with major decisions made through consensus 
by members of the Politburo Standing Committee (PBSC).187 Within the PBSC, 
rival factions compete for power and influence.188 Hu Jintao was considered one of 
the PBSC’s most Japan-friendly members by both Chinese and Japanese analysts.189 
But he had a slow start in consolidating his power.190 
Unlike Hu Jintao, current leader Xi Jinping was immediately put in charge of the 
PLA as chairman of the Central Military Commission.191 By all accounts, he has been 
central to China’s current Japan strategy. Before he took over as head of the CCP in 
November 2012, he was put in charge of a maritime security group in mid-2012, 
and then of the “Office to Respond to the Diaoyu Crisis” in September.192  
The first several months of Xi’s leadership gave few signs that he was ready to 
spend political capital to de-escalate the tensions in the East China Sea. Rather, one 
 
 
to the war, which some say presents a revisionist interpretation of history that downplays the 
atrocities committed. Richard C. Bush, The Perils of Proximity, op. cit., pp.146-147. 
184	“Japan’s Abe visits China, “turning point” in relations”, Xinhua News Agency, 9 October 2006. 
185	“温家宝抵达日本 ‘融冰之旅启航”，新华网 [“Wen Jiabao arrived in Japan, ‘ice melting trip’ 
took off”, Xinhua News Agency, 11 April 2007; and “中国国家主席胡锦涛结束访日’暖春之旅’启
程回国”，中国新闻网 [“Chinese President Hu Jintao finished ‘warm spring trip’ to Japan, heading 
back home”, Chinanews.com], 10 May 2010.  
186	See Section V.E “Failure of Joint Development”. 
187	Broadly speaking, the process involves “a group of members instead of a single president, 
consists of a large number of organs instead of just one, relies on the wisdom of a team instead 
of an individual, and opts for collective instead of personal decision-making”. “Spirit of collective 
leadership”, The China Daily, 11 August 2012. 
188	Cheng Li, “Intra-Party Democracy in China: Should We Take It Seriously?”, China Leadership 
Monitor, no. 30 (2009), p. 1. He further argued that the Chinese leadership has been increas-
ingly structured around two factions: the “populist coalition” and the “elitist coalition”. Cheng 
Li, “The Battle for China’s Top Nine Leadership Posts”, The Washington Quarterly, Center for 
Strategic and International Studies (Winter 2012), p. 132. 
189	Crisis Group interviews, Beijing, September 2012; Tokyo, October 2012. Hu Jintao was a 
protégé of Hu Yaobang. As head of the Chinese Communist Youth League, he received a delegation 
of 3,000 Japanese youth visiting China, including Yoshihiko Noda, who later became the prime 
minister who decided to purchase the islands. “Hu’s Japanese friend calls on him to remember 
their peace now”, The Asahi Shimbun, 1 October 2012; “Japan-China politics risk prolonging 
worst ties since 2005”, Bloomberg, 28 September 2012.  
190	Hu did not take over control of the military from Jiang until two years after he became head 
of the CCP. Zhengxu Wang, “Hu Jintao’s Power Consolidation: Groups, Institutions, and Power 
Balance in China’s Elite Politics”, Issues & Studies, vol. 42, no. 4 (December 2006), pp. 97-136. 
191 “Xi Jinping named chairman of CPC Central Military Commission”, Xinhua News Agency, 
15 November 2012. 
192 Crisis Group interview, Beijing, February 2013. Linda Jakobson, “How involved is Xi Jinping 
in the Diaoyu crisis”, The Diplomat, 8 February 2013.  
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of his early speeches was to urge the military to be combat-ready.193 However, in 
March 2013, PLA general Liu Yuan, a close ally of Xi, on several occasions warned 
against talks of war and said the island dispute “can be deferred, discussed and co-
ordinated. It is not worth resorting to humanity’s most extreme and violent methods 
to resolve it”.194  
Several factors could have contributed to Beijing’s desire to tone down the rhet-
oric. Although Xi took control of the CCP and the military in November 2012, it was 
not until the March 2013 National People’s Congress (NPC) that he became head of 
the state and major government posts, including the cabinet, were filled. The NPC 
allowed Xi to further consolidate power and place his allies in key positions. Ac-
cording to an analyst, the tensions on the Korean Peninsula since the third nuclear 
test in February 2013 encouraged Beijing to cool tensions somewhat with Japan, as 
the system is under strain with multiple foreign policy crises.195 China also likely 
has an interest in reducing the heat over the dispute to attempt to regularise and 
legitimise its concept of overlapping control. By shifting international attention 
elsewhere, it could be easier for Beijing to cement the new status quo.196 But alt-
hough the rhetoric has been moderated, China’s actions on the ground have not 
changed and it has set in motion a series of expectations and institutional changes 
to assert its claims.197 
2. Japan: Rapid succession of prime ministers  
Japanese leaders have had difficulty making inroads in improving ties with China 
partly due to the rapid succession of prime ministers in the past two decades 
(with the exception of Junichiro Koizumi), with seven prime ministers from 
2006-2013.198 Koizumi presided over a period that witnessed a deep freeze of po-
litical exchanges with China (2001-2006), due to his several visits to the Yasuku-
ni Shrine. The short reign of each prime minister after him made it challenging to 
forge stable personal ties and trust with Chinese counterparts. When the Liberal 
Democratic Party (LDP) was defeated by the DPJ in August 2009, Japan also lost 
many vital party-to-party ties and other political connections built up during nearly 
40 years of unbroken LDP rule.199 A Chinese scholar explained that because Chinese 
officials were “practical”, they were unwilling to waste too much time on “lame-duck 
or retired” foreign counterparts.200 
The dramatic change in direction of the DPJ’s foreign policy affected China-Japan 
relations. When Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama and DPJ Secretary-General 
Ichiro Ozawa took power in August 2009, they unveiled a vision for creating an 
“equal alliance” with the U.S. and a more “autonomous foreign policy” that empha-
 
 
193 “习近平考察广州战区谈 ’强国梦’ ‘强军梦’”, 新华社 [“Xi Jinping visited Guangzhou military 
region, spoke of ‘strong nation dream’ and ‘strong military dream’”，Xinhua News Agency], 
13 December 2012. 
194 “刘源指中日为面子闹僵 应让老百姓知道战争残酷”, 大公网 [“Liu Yuan said China-Japan stale-
mate was due to face, the people should know the cruelty of war”, Takungpao.com], 11 March 2013. 
195 Crisis Group interview, Beijing, March 2013. 
196 Crisis Group interview, Beijing, March 2013. 
197 See Section VI.D “Maritime Agencies in Ascendance”. 
198 Japan has had seventeen prime ministers since 1989. 
199	Crisis Group interview, Tokyo, October 2012. 
200	Crisis Group interview, Beijing, November 2012. 
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sised improving relations with Asia, especially China.201 Hatoyama, while meeting 
with President Hu Jintao at the UN in September 2009, declared a wish to turn 
the East China Sea into a “sea of fraternity instead of a sea of disputes”.202 The new 
ruling party promised to establish party-to-party ties with China, and Ozawa led a 
delegation of 600 to Beijing in December 2009.203 Ultimately, Hatoyama’s campaign 
promise to relocate the Futenma U.S. Marine Corps Air Station in Okinawa proved 
untenable. His desire for a more even relationship with both the U.S. and China 
strained ties with the former, whose security alliance with Japan is traditionally 
seen as a main tenant of regional security. 
China did not take advantage of this period in which Japan reached out its hand. 
It reportedly began drilling in the Chunxiao oil field in January 2010.204 Hatoyama 
and Ozawa were forced to resign in June 2010 due to the failure to relocate the 
Futenma base and financial scandals.205 Foreign policy reverted to a more pro-U.S. 
stance after Naoto Kan became prime minister, bringing pro-U.S. DPJ member Seiji 
Maehara into the foreign policy decision-making circle.206 Some Chinese analysts 
interpreted the change as confirmation that the Japanese government was beholden 
to the U.S. and suggested that this made it difficult for Chinese leaders to trust their 
Japanese counterparts.207  
The DPJ also started its tenure by curbing the influence of the bureaucracy and 
transferring power into the hands of politicians, to deliver on its campaign promise 
to correct political inertia.208 Some Japanese analysts said the reform went too far in 
sidelining experienced bureaucrats.209 This was compounded by the tumult around 
the Japanese leadership at the time of the September 2010 incident, which included 
a change of foreign minister.210  
 
 
201	“The Democratic Party of Japan’s Platform for Government: Putting People’s Lives First”, 
2009, p. 26. See also Tetsuo Kotani, “Turbulent Changes: The Democratic Party Government 
and Japan’s Foreign Policy”, Russia in Global Affairs, vol. 8, no. 4 (December 2010); and Daniel 
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Policy, no. 12 (July 2011). 
202	“China’s Hu, Japan’s Hatoyama agree to extend thaw in relations”, Bloomberg, 22 September 
2009. 
203	Hu Jintao also took individual photos with nearly every DPJ lawmaker on the trip. “Ozawa-led 
group welcomed in China/Hu, DPJ officials look”, The Yomiuri Shimbun, 12 December 2009. 
204	“Japan threatens action on China gas project-media”, Reuters, 17 January 2010.  
205	“Hatoyama resigns and takes Ozawa with him”, The Asahi Shimbun, 3 June 2010. 
206	“Kan appoints Seiji Maehara as Japan foreign minister in cabinet reshuffle”, Bloomberg, 17 
September 2010.  
207 Crisis Group interviews, Beijing, August, September 2012.  
208	“The Democratic Party of Japan’s Platform for Government”, op. cit., p. 2. See also Eric Heg-
inbotham, Ely Ratner and Richard J. Samuels, “Tokyo’s Transformation: How Japan is Changing 
– and What it Means for the United States”, Foreign Affairs (September-October 2011), pp. 138-148. 
209 Crisis Group interviews, Tokyo, October 2012. 
210 At the time of that incident, the DPJ had been in power barely a year and Prime Minister 
Naoto Kan in office for three months. Kan was in the last days of campaigning against a chal-
lenger from his own party. He then reshuffled the cabinet, making Seiji Maehara the new for-
eign minister on 17 September, just one week after the skipper was arrested. Maehara had been 
an advocate of non-compromising policies toward China, and according to Japanese scholars, 
had no interest in moderating Japan’s treatment of the Chinese captain. Two weeks into the cri-
sis, Kan travelled to New York to participate in the UN General Assembly. He apparently only 
left general advice on how to solve the crisis. Crisis Group interviews, Tokyo, October 2012. 
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Each DPJ government experienced a sharp decline in popularity. Public support 
for then-Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama eroded rapidly after his attempt to realign 
Japanese foreign policy failed, reaching 17 per cent at the end of May 2010, a near 
50-point decline in eight months.211 When Naoto Kan took over in June, support for 
his cabinet was at 60 per cent.212 His statements supporting an increase in consump-
tion tax upset voters, and the DPJ was defeated in the July 2010 upper house elec-
tions.213 After the March 2011 Tohoko earthquake and tsunami and subsequent 
Fukushima nuclear crisis, public support for Kan dropped to 21 per cent.214 The Noda 
government took over in August. By the time Ishihara announced his island purchase 
plan, public support for Noda had slumped to around 25 per cent and never recov-
ered.215 The unpopularity of the DPJ left a leadership vacuum that was exploited by 
populist and nationalist politicians.  
Disappointment with traditional politics and frustration with the failure to restore 
Japan to a prosperous path made many long for stronger leadership.216 This envi-
ronment gave rise to populist and nationalist politicians who were seen as credible 
alternatives to ineffectual and ambiguous leaders. These movements have been driv-
en, in part, by former Tokyo Governor Ishihara and Osaka Mayor Toru Hashimoto.217 
A Japanese analyst wrote that the Japanese wanted to “stop floating like a ghost in 
the sea of perpetual apologies for the Asia-Pacific War of 70 years ago”.218 Ishihara 
captured popular opinion after the 2010 boat incident and forced the government’s 
hand over the Diaoyu/Senkaku Island purchase.219  
Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, who took power after the LDP’s victory in the De-
cember 2012 elections, publicly stated, “there is no room for negotiation”.220 But he 
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has nevertheless shown a willingness to mend bilateral relations and sent a personal 
letter to Xi Jinping, delivered by the New Komeito Party leader Natsuo Yamaguchi 
in January 2013. Xi received Yamaguchi and the two spoke of their desire to over-
come difficulties.221 Optimism inspired by the meeting, however, quickly dissipated 
after reports of dangerous military encounters in the East China Sea.222 Added to 
that, Abe resumed nationalist rhetoric and gestures after he was elected, arousing 
the suspicion that he wanted to backtrack on Japan’s Second World War apolo-
gies.223 These decisions did not help to convince the Chinese public or leadership 
that Japan was sincere about mending ties.224  
3. Attempts to establish a hotline  
There have been several attempts to enhance communications by reestablishing a 
hotline between the Japanese and Chinese prime ministers. It was first inaugurated 
in October 2000, during a visit by Chinese Premier Zhu Rongji to Tokyo, in order 
to “increase trust and dispel suspicion in the political area”.225 It was never used 
throughout the Koizumi government during which Sino-Japanese relations grew 
frosty.226 Subsequent Japanese prime ministers all attempted to reopen the hotline 
to then-Chinese Premier Wen, but left office after brief tenures.227 An analyst said 
that Beijing has low expectations that even Abe will remain in office for long.228 
To date, the hotline has not been effectively used in a time of crisis or high 
tension.229 As a former Japanese diplomat explained, a hotline only works when 
the two countries have similar bureaucracies and strong mutual trust – both of which 
are lacking.230 Part of the problem is a mismatch in the two systems: while the 
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Chinese foreign ministry, 25 January 2013. 
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tioned the validity of comfort women in 1997 and upon taking office in 2012 expressed the de-
sire to revise the apology. “Japan’s nationalist prime minister wants to revise war apology”, The 
Daily Telegraph, 1 January 2013. In March 2013, he said verdicts of the International Military 
Tribunal for the Far East, after the Second World War, were victor’s justice and not views 
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prime minister in Japan heads the cabinet, the ruling party and the SDF, the Chinese 
premier does not head the communist party nor does he command the PLA. He 
would have to get his message approved before speaking in a crisis.231 Efforts to 
establish a military-to-military hotline have similarly stalled.232 
B. Disappearing Back Channels 
A tradition of back-channel diplomacy between high-level officials dating back to 
Zhou Enlai’s time – and known as a “pipe” by analysts in both countries – had 
enabled China and Japan to reestablish diplomatic ties and mend relations in times 
of trouble. The interlocutors were individuals in each government’s decision-
making centre who were influential in their respective party. Their positions and 
communication allowed for the effective flow of information up the chain of 
command to facilitate moderate policymaking. Because of the channel’s informal 
nature, sensitive discussions could be shielded from public pressure and provide 
space for diplomatic manoeuvres.  
The last stable and effective channel, between Hiromu Nonaka, former chief 
cabinet secretary in Japan, and Zeng Qinghong, a former PBSC member and vice 
president of China, ran from the late 1990s until 2008.233 Nonaka was a powerful 
figure in the LDP’s largest faction and then-Prime Minister Keizo Obuchi’s right-
hand man.234 Zeng, similarly, was a trusted protégé of Jiang Zemin and continued 
to be an influential powerbroker between factions in the CCP after Jiang retired.235 
The two men were known to meet “anytime there was trouble” to “extinguish it for 
the sake of bilateral relations”.236 In one such episode, Zeng swiftly dispatched Chi-
nese officials to investigate crimes reportedly committed by Chinese in Japan, after 
Nonaka made a complaint to him.237 
The Zeng-Nonaka channel lost its pull in 2008 when Zeng retired from public 
life.238 Subsequent efforts by the two countries to reestablish a high-level connection 
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Leadership Monitor, no. 20, 28 February 2007. 
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237	According to a Japanese journalist, Nonaka told him that Zeng was “very fast at handling 
everything” and shared an anecdote with him as proof. “One evening, when I [Nonaka] had 
dinner with him [Zeng] in Beijing, I pointed out that the crime rate of Chinese people in Japan 
was very high. The next morning at 6am, some people from the 公安部 (Public Security Bureau) 
came to my hotel room. They explained that most of the problematic figures in Japan are from 
Fujian Province. After several weeks, I was informed that two officials from the Fujian Province 
Police Department had been posted to the Chinese embassy in Tokyo to tackle the issue”. Crisis 
Group interview, Beijing, October 2012. Nonaka retired in 2003, but maintained regular contact 
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238	Zeng arguably could still exert influence on Chinese policy and politics as a retired but re-
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with similar influence have been interrupted. A connection first appeared to have 
been established between Hidenao Nakagawa, former LDP secretary-general, and 
Wang Jiarui, then-director of the International Department of the Central Commit-
tee of the CCP.239 In an interview, Nakagawa stressed the importance of “pipes” 
between politicians in addition to regular diplomatic channels.240 But the channel 
unravelled in 2009, when the LDP was defeated by the DPJ.  
The absence of effective backchannels during the 2010 and 2012 crises deprived 
the two countries of a discreet means to avoid misunderstanding and foster trust. 
More important, personal interactions through backchannels had served to put 
human faces on events that otherwise would be solely considered cold political or 
geopolitical motivations. “If human beings meet, they can always find a way out, 
but the current situation is like a computer game with no human contact between 
the two parties”, said a former Japanese envoy to China.241 Veteran diplomats in 
both countries have tried to revive the tradition of backchannels in order to thaw 
the current standoff, but such efforts have been derailed by escalatory events.242 
Back-channel diplomacy naturally had its limits. It depended heavily on individu-
als, thus was vulnerable to politics. It could only be effective when there was will from 
top leaders to place higher priority on preserving bilateral ties than on scoring points 
on a single dispute. Nonaka, for example, was unable to dissuade Koizumi from visit-
ing the Yasukuni Shrine, despite the expectations China placed on him.243 Neither 
can personal ties negate changes in national objectives. China’s view on the utility of 
“shelving the dispute” changed, and instead it tries to erode Japanese administration 
of the islands. In fact, the disappearance of back-channel diplomacy can be seen as 
one symptom of these changes. According to a Chinese analyst, “leaders of the two 
countries just don’t trust each other anymore”.244 
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C. Challenges Facing Foreign Ministries 
1. Weakening Chinese foreign ministry  
Another factor that has complicated the relationship between China and Japan 
and prevented effective management of crises is the relative weakness of the Chinese 
foreign ministry, which is the official – and often the only – channel open to To-
kyo.245 Although the ministry technically remains responsible for the formulation 
and execution of foreign policy, its leadership role, responsibility and authority on 
most strategic foreign policy issues have been diluted as China’s global role has 
grown and many formerly domestically oriented agencies have acquired foreign 
policy responsibilities.246 One example was the November 2012 issuing of new 
passports with a map including disputed territories in the South China Sea, which 
enraged other claimant states.247 The decision had been made by the Public Security 
Bureau and the passports went to print over the objection of the foreign ministry, 
which was told, “passports are an issue of immigration and not foreign policy”.248 As 
a government analyst said, “Chinese foreign policymaking has been fragmented”.249 
In Japan, the foreign ministry holds a higher position. Therefore there has been 
a mismatch in the relative power of the diplomats who were tasked with discussing 
Japan’s plan to purchase the islands and the aftermath. In Japan, a foreign ministry 
division chief overseeing China policy directly briefs the prime minister.250 Converse-
ly, in China, a state councillor in charge of foreign policy is responsible for liaising 
with the senior leadership.251 The state councillor is one rank above the foreign 
minister and one rank below the vice premier. Although she or he is the highest-
ranking official in charge of foreign affairs, she or he is not even a member of the 
CCP’s 25-strong Politburo, the second-highest level decision-making organ in the 
party after the Politburo Standing Committee (PBSC).252  
Japan began informing China of its intention to purchase the disputed islands in 
June through the Chinese foreign ministry.253 While the Chinese side expressed its 
general opposition to the move, Japanese diplomats said that there was no signalling 
of planned reactions to the purchase.254 It is plausible that the asymmetry of the 
two ministries’ influence in their respective government contributed somewhat to 
Tokyo’s inaccurate reading of Beijing’s understanding and intentions. Japanese 
officials and diplomats came away with the impression that their Chinese counter-
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parts had understood – yet of course opposed to – Japan’s rationale for making the 
move.  
After the island purchase, communications between the two foreign ministries 
were reduced to very formulaic meetings. According to officials on both sides, diplo-
mats spent entire meetings without any real dialogue, simply reciting their official 
stances.255 Démarches have also become formulaic.256 A Japanese envoy attempting 
to open up additional communication channels lamented that Chinese foreign minis-
try officials “may have lost almost all influence but we are only given access to 
them”.257 
The foreign ministry’s job is made tougher by the fact that it is often outside of the 
information loop on incidents involving other agencies but which have foreign affairs 
implications. This happened with the USNS Impeccable incident in 2009.258 Sim-
ilarly, the ministry was reportedly not consulted or even informed about Hainan 
province’s new maritime security regulations empowering provincial border police to 
board and search foreign vessels when they were first announced in November 2012. 
When diplomats from other countries sought clarification, the ministry was unaware 
and unprepared.259 It also apparently learned about the 30 January 2013 alleged 
radar-locking incident seven days later through the media, instead of the navy, and 
even then, it still lacked enough facts to comment.260 Therefore, the agency with ar-
guably the greatest interest in de-escalating tensions has limited room for manoeuvre.  
One reason for the Chinese foreign ministry’s lack of authority is that domestic 
priorities, such as sustaining economic growth and political stability, still far out-
weigh foreign policy.261 According to a Chinese analyst, “the Diaoyu Islands may be 
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Morning Post, 5 February 2013. 
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berg, 9 March 2009. The foreign ministry learned about the incident from a Western embassy, 
not its own navy. Crisis Group interview, Beijing, August 2011.  
259	Crisis Group interview, December 2012. 
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261	With economic growth commonly regarded as a source of the government’s legitimacy, the 
foreign policy is primarily aimed at creating a favourable international environment for eco-
nomic growth. David Lampton, “China’s Foreign and National Security Policy-making Process: 
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the priority of Chinese foreign policy, but economic development is still the priority of 
overall Chinese policy”.262 The foreign ministry is also often made the scapegoat for 
any problems that arise in foreign policy, even if the issue is not a result of its error. 
For example, it was blamed for having abstained from the 2011 UN resolution au-
thorising the no-fly zone over Libya, allowing it to pass.263 A Chinese analyst said the 
ministry was criticised for “placing too much importance on diplomatic relations 
while losing sight of the entirety of national interests”, and was further stripped 
of decision-making power.264 A Chinese scholar remarked that the agency had been 
reduced to “a protocol department and is busying itself with administrative tasks”.265  
2. Diminishing “China school” in the Japanese foreign ministry  
Japan’s diplomacy with China has also suffered from the relative decline of a group 
within the foreign ministry known as the “China school”. Comprised of specialists 
equipped with extensive China-specific experience and language skills, they were 
known for their commitment to a good friendship with their neighbour. For many 
years, these diplomats headed the ministry’s China and Mongolia division as well 
as the Asian and Oceanic Affairs Bureau. These two departments, along with the vice 
foreign minister, formed the core of China policy within the ministry. China school 
officials for a long time also served as ambassadors to China and as heads of the 
Cabinet Councillors’ Office on External Affairs. These individuals were professionally 
committed to Sino-Japanese relations and had “a vested institutional interest in 
avoiding conflict under their watch”.266  
The China school began to lose its influence in the late 1990s due to a hardening 
of the public’s attitude toward China and the chill in relations during the Koizumi 
era. The foreign ministry came under severe criticism for its handling of several 
China-related incidents, especially the Chinese police’s seizure of North Koreans 
who sought asylum in the Japanese consulate in Shenyang in May 2002, resulting 
in significant erosion of the diplomats’ credibility.267 They were attacked by national-
ists as “weaklings who would wag their tails when facing China”.268 A Japanese ana-
lyst close to the government noted, “China school diplomats are always vulnerable 
to right-wing attacks” and it has become politically risky to be seen as belonging to 
this faction.269 
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Beginning with Koizumi, China school diplomats were gradually phased out of 
key positions, marking, in the words of a Japanese official, “a conscious shift by 
the government”.270 Kunihiko Makita – the last China school diplomat who headed 
the Asian and Oceanic Affairs Bureau – told a newspaper in 2012 that since he left 
in 2001, his former post has been filled by “diplomats trained in America” who he 
worried “are not necessarily well-versed in China”.271 Similarly in 2006, the director 
of the China and Mongolia division was not a Chinese-speaker – a first for that 
position – but was a specialist on Japanese-U.S. relations.272 In 2010, Uichiro Niwa, 
a top business executive and the former chairman of ITOCHU corporation, one of 
the largest Japanese trading firms, was appointed ambassador to China, a break 
from the previous practice of filling the post with China school veterans. By the 
time Sino-Japanese relations entered their most challenging stretch in 2010, the 
traditional China school diplomats had lost influence, with their successors tending 
to be tougher on China.273 The result was that certain decisions were made without 
what a former China school diplomat termed “the ‘feel’ of China”.274  
D. Maritime Agencies in Ascendance 
1. China’s maritime law enforcement agencies 
China’s maritime law enforcement agencies are its primary tool to strengthen its 
claims in recent disputes. Maritime law enforcement was historically divided among 
five agencies competing for funding, jurisdiction and political influence.275 The 
rivalry between them created overlaps in their responsibilities, inefficiency in re-
source deployment and poor coordination.276 The China Marine Surveillance (Marine 
Surveillance) and the China Fisheries Law Enforcement Command (Fisheries) 
have played the most active roles in asserting maritime claims. Marine Surveillance 
is under the State Oceanic Administration of the land and resources ministry. The 
Fisheries was overseen by the Bureau of Fisheries Administration of the agriculture 
ministry before restructuring began in early 2013 to place it under the State Oceanic 
Administration. Marine Surveillance and Fisheries for many years have been tasked 
with occupying or patrolling disputed areas in the South China Sea.277 They are also 
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at the forefront of the struggle with the JCG to administer waters around the Diaoyu/ 
Senkaku Islands.  
The Marine Surveillance and Fisheries have traditionally been rivals, competing 
not only for a larger share of the State Council’s budget but also the leadership role 
among law enforcement agencies.278 They had been expanding rapidly as China 
cultivated its growing maritime ambitions.279 Both have institutional interests in 
demonstrating China’s sovereignty in disputed areas, as defending maritime rights 
against foreign countries is one of the most important political achievements of 
both agencies.280 They have also been compelled to justify the increase in quality 
and quantity of their fleets by showcasing their resolve and ability to patrol further 
and more frequently in disputed waters.281  
The two agencies have profited directly from tensions in the East and South 
China Seas. In 2012, a dramatically increased budget allowed Fisheries to spend 
more on equipment procurement that year than the sum of the previous 60 years.282 
The same year, the number of Marine Surveillance vessels patrolling China-claimed 
waters increased from six to more than ten each day.283 The announcement of the 
territorial baselines around the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands further empowered the 
agencies directly while constraining the foreign ministry’s ability to rein them in.284 
In November 2012, a new 3,000-ton boat Haijian 137 was added to the Marine 
Surveillance East Sea fleet and began patrolling waters around Diaoyu/Senkaku the 
next month.285 In December 2012, a new 5,000-ton boat Yuzheng 206, “one of the 
largest and most advanced fishery patrol vessels in China”, began its maiden voyage 
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from Shanghai to patrol near the disputed islands.286 A new opportunity for funding 
arises each time there is an incident or a major development in Japan’s capability.287  
Despite new capacity, regular patrols of the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands have 
strained China’s maritime law enforcement capacity. Vessels and personnel from 
the North Sea and South Sea fleets have been diverted to reinforce the East Sea 
fleet.288 Marine Surveillance officials have often cited the need to compete with the 
JCG to advocate for faster expansion of its fleet.289  
The PLA and the civilian maritime agencies maintain close linkages. The State 
Oceanic Administration was administered by the PLA Navy in the first sixteen years 
following its establishment in 1964, providing technical support for the navy.290 
Marine Surveillance personnel have received navy training.291 In 2009, the PLA and 
Marine Surveillance signed an agreement to cooperate on maritime law enforcement 
and safeguarding maritime rights, joint surveillance and research, equipment supply 
and maintenance, and personnel exchange, and have since held annual meetings.292 
Retired naval vessels have been regularly re-outfitted to become law enforcement 
boats.293 In October 2012, the PLA Navy’s East Sea Fleet held a joint exercise with 
the Marine Surveillance and Fisheries – the third such drill aimed at safeguarding 
sovereign rights in disputed waters.294 
Prior to the restructuring in March 2013, the Marine Surveillance emerged as the 
more powerful and influential of the two, seen as the “spearhead”, with more vessels 
patrolling in disputed waters more frequently.295 This is partly due to its considerably 
broader jurisdiction, while Fisheries’ duties were technically tied to fishing activities 
(although that has not necessarily been respected in practice).296 Marine Surveil-
 
 
286	“Patrol ships starts maiden voyage to Diaoyu Islands”, The China Daily, 12 December 2012.  
287	Crisis Group interviews, Beijing, September-October 2012. 
288	Crisis Group interview, Beijing, January 2013.  
289	“中国海监舰机这一年底气大增” [“Chinese Marine Surveillance’s vessel and plane capability 
grew significantly this year”], op. cit. 
290	“专家：中国海监装备与日本海保相比还有差距”, 中国新闻周刊 [“Experts: Chinese Marine 
Surveillance is underequipped compared with JCG”, China News Weekly], 30 November 2012. 
291	“海监政委首次走进海军高等学府接受系统培训”, 中国海洋报 [“Marine Surveillance commis-
sars accepted into naval academy to receive systematic training for the first time”, China Ocean 
News], 27 July 2011, as cited in Linda Jakobson, “China’s Foreign Policy Dilemma”, Lowy Insti-
tute for International Policy (February 2013), p. 10. 
292	“国家海洋局与中国人民解放军海军年度工作座谈会在京召开”, 国家海洋局, [“State Oceanic 
Administration and PLA Navy held annual working conference in Beijing”, State Oceanic Admin-
istration website], 19 February 2013.  
293	This includes the above-mentioned Haijian 137 and Yuzheng 206, which recently joined Diaoyu/ 
Senkaku patrolling. “3000 吨级海监 137 船入列中国海监东海总队” [“3,000-ton boat Haijian 
137 enlisted to China Maritime Surveillance East Sea Unit”], op. cit. “Patrol ships starts maiden 
voyage to Diaoyu Islands”, The China Daily, 12 December 2012.  
294	“中国海军组织东海海上联合维权演习受关注”, 中国新闻网 [“PLA Navy organised joint exercise 
in East China Sea defending maritime rights, attracting attention”, Chinanews.com], 19 October 2012. 
295	Crisis Group interviews, Beijing, January, February 2013.  
296	Fisheries’ duties include regulating the domestic fishing industry; safeguarding fishing ves-
sels and land features, rocks and reefs claimed by China; preventing foreign vessels from fishing 
in areas claimed by China; and where necessary, expelling them. Marine Surveillance’s duties 
include patrolling and surveying Chinese-administered maritime territories; investigating and 
processing illegal activities violating China’s maritime rights, including illegal use of maritime 
territories and resources, activities that damage maritime facilities, environment and resources, 
and activities that disturb maritime order. “农业部渔政指挥中心职能简介”, 中华人民共和国农业
部[“Missions of agriculture ministry Fisheries Administration Command Centre”, Chinese agri-
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lance also had larger and better-equipped vessels and enjoyed more political clout, 
as its parent agency, the State Oceanic Administration, had more independence and 
flexibility compared with other agencies of the same level.297 The agency head, Liu 
Cigui, also has close ties to Xi Jinping.298  
The State Oceanic Administration’s dominant status was solidified in March 2013 
during the annual National People’s Congress, when it absorbed three additional law 
enforcement agencies including the Fisheries to create “the China Maritime Police 
Administration”.299 The consolidation, according to State Councillor Ma Kai, was 
aimed at correcting “diffusion of maritime law enforcement capabilities, overlapping 
[maritime] inspection, duplicative construction … and insufficient ability to safe-
guard [maritime] rights”.300 Implementation of the reorganisation has begun, includ-
ing the drafting of new regulations defining jurisdiction, criminal law enforcement 
authority, and levels of fleet weaponisation.301 It will take place over several months, 
likely accompanied by new laws and regulations defining the duties, jurisdiction and 
operating procedures of the new State Oceanic Administration.302  
Another key element in the reorganisation was the establishment of the Na-
tional Oceanic Commission. Details of its configuration have yet to emerge, but it 
is likely to be under the direct supervision of the State Council and composed of 
high-level officials of agencies, such as the foreign ministry, the military, the State 
Oceanic Administration and the public security ministry, whose responsibilities 
 
 
culture ministry, undated]; and “高起点高标准打造一流海监队伍”, 中国海洋报 [“Building a 
first-class China Marine Surveillance team”, China Ocean News], 21 October 2008. 
297	The State Oceanic Administration was first created in 1964 by the State Council and was un-
der its direct management. Although it was placed under the land and resources ministry in 
1998, the State Oceanic Administration has enjoyed higher status and influence than same-level 
agencies that were created by ministries. Crisis Group interviews, Beijing, September 2012, 
February and March 2013. “海洋局历史沿革与职能”, 新华网 [“Historical evolvement and duties 
of the State Oceanic Administration”, Xinhua News Agency], undated. 
298	They both served in the Fujian provincial government from 1993 to 1997. 
299	“China to restructure oceanic administration, enhance maritime law enforcement”, Xinhua 
News Agency, 10 March 2013. “图表：国务院机构改革后国务院设置组成部门一览”, 新华社 
[“Chart: Structure of State Council-affiliated agencies after State Council organisational reform”, 
Xinhua News Agency], 10 March 2013. Only the Marine Safety Administration under the transpor-
tation ministry still remains outside of the State Oceanic Administration. Before the NPC, three 
proposals had been made to reorganise maritime law enforcement: to create a new overarching 
agency similar to a unified coast guard; to place Marine Surveillance in charge of other agencies 
except Fisheries; or to simply enhance coordination. Implementation of the reorganisation has 
just begun but likely will be challenging due to frustration and resistance of other agencies who 
had to lose power. Crisis Group interviews, Shanghai, November 2012; Beijing, March 2013. Con-
trary to expectation, the State Oceanic Administration was not upgraded to a ministry, reportedly 
due in part to opposition from the foreign ministry, which feared further losing influence over 
maritime issues. Li Mingjiang and Zhang Hongzhou, “Restructuring China’s Maritime Law En-
forcement: Impact on Regional Security”, S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Nanyang 
Technological University, no. 050, 1 April 2013. 
300	“马凯：重新组建国家海洋局 设立高层次议事协调机构国家海洋委员会”, 新华社 [“Ma Kai: 
Restructure State Oceanic Administration, establish high-level coordinating agency State Oceanic 
Commission”, Xinhua News Agency], 10 March 2013.  
301	Crisis Group telephone interview, March 2013. “中国海警局刑事执法权和武器配备问题即将
明确”, 中国新闻 [“Criminal law enforcement authority and weaponisation of China Maritime 
Police Bureau to be clarified soon”, China.com], 20 March 2013.  
302	Crisis Group telephone interview, March 2013.  
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include maritime affairs.303 It is expected to formulate China’s first comprehensive 
maritime strategy, covering areas such as safeguarding maritime rights, developing 
maritime economy and projecting naval capabilities to protect the country’s ever-
growing overseas interests. As a Chinese analyst put it, the commission will define 
strategies and coordinate like “a brain” so that the consolidated maritime law en-
forcement capacity will become “a tightly clenched fist” – in contrast to the “open 
palm” of its previous fragmented existence – in safeguarding the country’s maritime 
rights.304 The consolidation was clearly not designed to dampen the ardour of the 
agencies, but to ensure that they are more focused, better coordinated, better 
equipped and more effective in defending maritime claims.  
2. Japan Coast Guard 
Japan’s post-war constitution bars the government from having a military force, 
but it has worked around this restriction by maintaining the Self-Defence Force 
(SDF) with legal restrictions on its tasks, operations and use of force.305 In the mar-
itime domain, Japan has also built up the JCG and increased cooperation between 
military and civilian institutions. Some scholars thus believe it acts as a quasi-
military force.306 
The JCG, under the land, infrastructure, transportation and tourism ministry, 
has a traditional maritime law enforcement role, including policing and search and 
rescue missions. But it is also responsible for guarding Japanese territorial waters 
and EEZs, and is a first responder to incursions.307 The JCG has acquired the right 
to fire direct warning shots at foreign vessels in certain circumstances.308  
Japan has increased coordination between the SDF and the JCG through regular 
mutual training, information exchange and joint exercises, in part for crisis man-
agement.309 This was apparent after Japanese radars failed to detect the Marine 
Surveillance plane that flew over the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands on 13 December 2012. 
 
 
303	Crisis Group telephone and email interviews, March 2013. 
304	叶海林, “国家海洋委员会：中国维护海洋权益的真正中枢”, 人民日报［Ye Hailin, “National 
Oceanic Commission: True central nervous system for the defence of China’s maritime rights”, 
The People’s Daily], 14 March 2013. 
305	Article 9 of Japan’s constitution states that it “renounces war as a sovereign right” and thus 
“land, sea, and air forces, as well as other war potential, will never be maintained”. Chapter II, 
Article 9, Japan Constitution, 8 November 1946. Akihiko Tanaka, “Japan’s Security Policy in the 
1990s”, in Yoichi Funabashi (ed.), Japan’s International Agenda (New York, 1994), p. 30.  
306	A scholar called it a “de facto fourth branch of the Japanese military”. Richard Samuels, “New 
‘Fighting Power!’ for Japan?”, Audit of Conventional Wisdom, MIT Center for International 
Studies, vol. 7, no. 14 (September 2007). 
307	See “Japan Coast Guard”, Policy Evaluation and Public Relations Office, Japan Coast Guard, 
March 2012. 
308	Law No. 114 of 2 November 2001. Amendment to the Japan Coast Guard Law, Law No. 28 of 
27 April 1948. In December 2001, Japanese armed forces, made up of a dozen patrol vessels and 
two navy destroyers, chased what they believed to be a North Korean spy ship. The JCG vessels 
opened fire, sinking the ship. It was the first time since the Second World War that Japanese forc-
es had sunk a ship, and the vessel is now on display in the JCG Museum in Yokohama. “Japan 
sinks ‘North Korea spying ship”, The Daily Telegraph, 24 December 2001. 
309	“Defense of Japan 2012”, Japanese defence ministry, p. 200 www.mod.go.jp/e/publ/w_paper/ 
2012.html. “National Defense Program Guidelines for FY2011 and beyond”, Japanese defence 
ministry, 17 December 2010. Crisis Group interview, Tokyo, October 2012. 
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As the plane flew below Japanese radars, the Air Self-Defence Force (ASDF) was 
only alerted to its presence after a JCG vessel spotted it.310  
After China stepped up regular patrols of waters around the Diaoyu/Senkaku 
Islands following the September 2012 purchase, Japan responded by increasing 
the number of JCG vessels patrolling the islands from three to 30.311 There has been 
growing agreement among Japanese politicians that the JCG needs to be “reinforced” 
for fear that its capability will be “overtaken by the Chinese”.312 The 26 October 2012 
government economic stimulus plan gave the JCG the largest ever disbursement 
of special funds, and the first specifically for territorial water patrol.313 The agency 
again received a 37 per cent budget increase for the financial year 2013 from the 
previous year.314 A dedicated Senkaku Island team was created, with the aim of 
deploying ten new patrol boats to the area in the next three years.315 The JCG has 
also received increased legal jurisdiction due to the island dispute.316 
This build-up must be seen in the context of the September 2010 collision, 
which caused the Japanese government “great embarrassment” and led to changes 
in the jurisdiction of the JCG.317 It was instructed by the government to be “more 
careful”, as it was responsible for preventing any further incident, and accordingly 
adjusted its engagement with Chinese vessels in order to minimise risks.318 The JCG 
has adopted a “defensive mode” when patrolling the waters near the Diaoyu/Senkaku 
Islands so as to prevent an activist landing on the islands or a deliberate or accidental 
collision with Chinese ships.319 It has enhanced manoeuvres including shadowing, 
which may give the JCG the capability to repel Chinese ships without having to use 
force.320  
 
 
310	“Japan scramble jets in island dispute with China”, The New York Times, 13 December 2012.  
311	Crisis Group interview, Tokyo, October 2012.  
312	Tetsuo Kotani, “China’s Fortress Fleet-in-Being and its Implications for Japan’s Security”, 
IFRI: Centre for Asian Studies (February 2013), p. 24. Japanese analysts said most JCG vessels 
were built in the 1980s and before September 2012, very few had been replaced. One added, 
“China gave the Japan Coast Guard justification to expand”. Crisis Group interviews, Tokyo, 
October 2012. “Editorial: Govt must boost JCG power to control Senkaku Islands”, The Yomiuri 
Shimbun, 19 August 2012.  
313	According to Shuji Kondo, an official in the JCG’s budget office, the funds were the equiva-
lent of $181 million (¥17 billion) in new vessels, helicopters and equipment. “The race to beef up 
Japan’s Coast Guard”, The Wall Street Journal, 27 October 2012.  
314	“Budget to strengthen SDF in defence of Senkakus”, The Asahi Shimbun, 30 January 2013.  
315	By January 2013, four 1,000-ton class patrol vessels of the new force had begun construction 
under the reserve funds from 2012, with the remaining six to be constructed with funds from 
the new budget. “JCG to create 600-strong Senkaku unit”, The Yomiuri Shimbun, 30 January 
2013; “Budget to strengthen SDF, Japan Coast Guard in defence of Senkakus”, The Asahi 
Shimbun, 30 January 2013.  
316	The Coast Guard Law was amended in 2012 to give the JCG the authority to arrest people 
who make an unapproved landing or conduct illegal activities in Japanese territory. Crisis 
Group interviews, Tokyo, October 2012. “Japan Coast Guard bill seeks more muscle for island 
dispute”, The Wall Street Journal, 16 August 2012. 
317	Crisis Group interview, Tokyo, October 2012.  
318	Crisis Group interview, Tokyo, October 2012.  
319	Crisis Group interview, Tokyo, October 2012.  
320	Another example is the “pincer move” in which it uses two vessels to stop a boat from either 
side. Crisis Group interview, Tokyo, October 2012.  
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Unlike its Chinese counterparts, the JCG has not demonstrated any desire to 
shape or get ahead of national foreign policy.321 It was consulted only one week 
before the island purchase in September 2012, after the government had already 
made its decision, and was not enthusiastic about the plan.322 It was also questioned 
in the Diet (parliament) following the 15 August 2012 activist landing incident to 
explain why it did not arrest the activists for obstruction.323 However, as a frontline 
actor, it has the ability to shape information flow and influence the course of events. 
This was illustrated after the 2010 incident when a JCG guardsman uploaded a video 
of the collision against the government’s decision, leading to a public uproar against 
the government for being too conciliatory toward China.324 
E. Failure of Joint Development 
With both legal and diplomatic means to settle the sovereignty dispute compromised, 
continued peace hinges upon effectively managing differences. Cooperation on joint 
resource management in the East China Sea while setting aside – but not renounc-
ing – maritime claims could be a practical way to build mutual trust and reap 
tangible benefits. In addition to the sovereignty dispute over the islands, the two 
countries disagree over delineation of the EEZs. They have attempted to jointly 
develop resources, moving close to a deal in 2008. However, the agreement ulti-
mately collapsed when China failed to overcome domestic nationalist opposition. 
In light of the tensions after the 2012 island purchase, another attempt at joint 
development appears further from reach. 
The failure of joint development demonstrated the limits of the leaders’ influ-
ence, the struggles of the foreign ministries and the ability of hardliners in China 
to derail the agreement. The unsettled delimitation in the East China Sea sparked 
several rounds of tensions as both sides accused the other of unilaterally drilling 
in disputed areas.325 Despite confrontations, the two countries in June 2008 reached 
 
 
321	The transport minister, whose ministry oversees the JCG, can give a directive to the com-
mandant [the head] of the JCG but not the rest of the coast guard staff in order for the agency to 
be independent of political pressure. This provision only applies to the JCG, the police and public 
prosecutors offices. However, since the JCG also works in disputed areas, occasionally political 
decisions at the highest level are needed, hence the channel between the minister and the com-
mandant. Crisis Group interview, Tokyo, October 2012.  
322	Crisis Group interview, Tokyo, October 2012.  
323	Crisis Group interview, Tokyo, October 2012.  
324	Guardsman Masaharu Isshiki, who uploaded the video on 4 November 2010, was arrested on 
the suspicion that he violated the National Public Service Law, and though he was not prosecuted, 
he was suspended by the JCG. Shelia Smith, “Japan and the East China Sea Dispute”, Foreign Pol-
icy Research Institute (Summer 2012), pp. 378-379; “Coast guardsmen leak case ends next week”, 
The Japan Times, 15 January 2011. Nearly 50 other JCG officers were investigated and repri-
manded for their role in the leak. “Over 50 Coast Guard officials to be reprimanded for video leak”, 
The Wall Street Journal, 20 December 2010. The discipline given to the JCG officer that leaked 
the video caused a public uproar and opened the government to attacks by opposition leaders for 
releasing the Chinese captain but pursuing legal action again Japanese coast guardsmen. This in-
cident led the upper house to pass a no-confidence vote against Chief Cabinet Secretary Yoshito 
Sengoku and Transport Minister Sumio Mabuchi. “Sengoku refuses to be sunk by censure vote”, 
The Wall Street Journal, 29 November 2010.  
325	See Xinjun Zhang, “Why the 2008 Sino-Japanese Consensus on the East China Sea Has 
Stalled: Good Faith and Reciprocity Considerations in Interim Measures Pending a Maritime 
Boundary Delimitation”, Ocean Development & International Law (18 February 2011), pp. 53-
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“principled consensus” to jointly develop resources in the sea, pending maritime 
delineation. This breakthrough was achieved through eleven rounds of bilateral 
consultations over three years and after mutual visits from top leaders.326 Without 
affecting each country’s legal position on delimitation, the consensus stipulated that 
they jointly develop a block of about 2,600 sq km that straddles the median line 
in order to make the East China Sea “a sea of peace, cooperation and friendship”.327 
To implement the consensus, the two countries would have to “fulfil their respective 
domestic procedures” and finalise a bilateral treaty.328  
According to a Japanese diplomat who participated in the negotiations, Japan 
was ready to sign an implementation treaty but the Chinese foreign ministry pulled 
back after it came under strong public criticism for “selling out” to Japan.329 Be-
cause the block agreed for joint development sits astride the median line, part in the 
disputed area and part in the undisputed Chinese side, the consensus was seen by 
some in China as making too many concessions.330 An activist group petitioned 
the National People’s Congress to repeal the consensus, saying it violated the Chinese 
constitution.331 A Chinese scholar confirmed that public opposition was a significant 
factor in stalling the plan and he criticised the foreign ministry for making a hasty 
concession to “gild Hu Jintao’s visit to Japan”.332 Others believe the then-head of 
the Chinese National Energy Administration – which would have been in charge of 
implementing joint development – Zhang Guobao, who speaks Japanese, was 
strongly opposed to the consensus, preventing a government working group from 
advancing the deal.333  
High-level commitment to joint development seemed to have persisted for a 
while but failed to go beyond pledges. In May 2010, Wen and Hatoyama agreed 
in a meeting in Tokyo to launch negotiations on implementing the consensus.334 
But following the boat collision, China on 10 September cancelled negotiations 
scheduled to take place a few days after.335  
 
 
65. See also James Manicom, “Sino-Japanese Cooperation in the East China Sea: Limitations 
and Prospects”, Contemporary Southeast Asia, vol. 30, no. 3 (2008), pp. 455-478. 
326	Section V.A.1 “Challenges of Japan policymaking in China”. 
327	“China, Japan reach principled consensus on East China Sea issue”, Xinhua News Agency, 18 
June 2008; “中日东海问题达成共识 专家即时解读”, 环球时报 [“China, Japan reach consensus on 
East China Sea issue, experts explain”, The Global Times], 19 June 2012. 
328	Ibid.  
329	Crisis Group interview, Tokyo, October 2012. 
330	Many online posts called it a document that “surrenders the country’s sovereignty rights un-
der humiliating terms” and demanding that it be abolished. See for example, “杨芳州：再谈必须
立即彻底废除’东海共识”, 共识网 [“Yang Fangzhou: ‘East China Sea consensus’ must be repealed 
immediately”, 21ccom.cn]; and “丧权辱国的东海共识!” 天涯社区 [“East China Sea Consensus hu-
miliates the nation and forfeit its sovereignty!”, Tianya BBS], www.tianya.cn/publicforum/content/ 
worldlook/1/532128.shtml. 
331	“中日东海共识被指违宪 民间保钓联会上书人大 要求否决”, 明报 [“China Japan consensus on 
East China Sea is accused of being unconstitutional, civilian Diaoyu protection association 
wrote to NPC, demand veto”, Ming Pao], 11 October 2009. 
332	Crisis Group interview, Beijing, August 2012. 
333	Crisis Group interview Beijing, November 2012. 
334	“Wen Jiabao holds talks with Japanese Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama”, press release, Chinese 
foreign ministry, 31 May 2010. 
335	“中方决定推迟第二次东海问题政府间谈判”, 中国新闻网 [“China postpones the second round 
of inter-governmental negotiation on East China Sea issue”, Chinanews.com], 11 September 2010. 
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VII. Risks of a Civilian or Military Clash 
With an increased number of vessels and aircraft patrolling in the disputed waters 
and air space, the possibility of an accidental clash has increased. Although so far 
both sides have refrained from taking actions to forcefully expel the other’s law 
enforcement vessels around the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands, a maritime collision 
could happen because of rough weather, low visibility, mechanical failures or 
miscalculations.336 The lack of a mechanism to share and understand each other’s 
intentions, protocols and bottom lines increases risks of misunderstanding. If an 
accident takes place, it could result in an armed skirmish, especially as JCG patrol 
vessels are armed with autocannons and certain Chinese law enforcement vessels 
are equipped with machine guns.337  
If a collision or armed exchange occurs between law enforcement vessels, esca-
lation and possibly military intervention cannot be ruled out, given the proximity of 
naval forces. Under Japanese domestic law, the SDF can be deployed for maritime 
security operations with the prime minister’s approval.338 What constitutes such a 
situation has not been clarified, though it has been invoked for incursions in Ja-
pan’s territorial waters by foreign submarines and in anti-piracy operations.339 
Chinese laws are also unclear about when to call in the PLA Navy for reinforcement 
as official policies and laws on maritime security have yet to be fully developed.340 
The absence of clear legal standards could also reflect the PLA’s aversion to having 
its hands tied by legal restrictions, as “the vaguer the law, the bigger the room to 
make achievements”, said a Chinese maritime law expert.341 
The risks are likely to be long-term, as both countries are determined to main-
tain their law enforcement presence in the disputed waters. As a Chinese analyst 
explained, China sees no need to back down as “now it’s a matter of competing with 
comprehensive strength”. He added, “China is not afraid of Japan on this front”.342 
For its part, the Japanese side is committed to continuing to push back and, in the 
 
 
336	When approaching one another, they flash electronic signs and demand through radio for the 
other side to leave. A high-level JCG official said Chinese ships flash their signs in both Chinese 
and Japanese, although the Japanese signs are “not very precise”. He also said that the JCG has 
about 110 employees who speak Chinese. Crisis Group interviews, Beijing, September 2012; Tokyo, 
October 2012. Chinese vessels also typically exit the 12-nm zone before nightfall, when reduced 
visibility increases risks for accidents. Crisis Group interview, Beijing, December 2012.  
337	Crisis Group interview, Beijing, February 2013. A Chinese Fisheries cutter that entered ser-
vice in 2010 was the first to be armed with a pair of 14.5mm machine guns. Lyle Goldstein, 
“China’s approach to fisheries management”, Testimony Submitted to the U.S. Congressional 
China Security and Economic Review Commission, 26 January 2012. JCG has 30-mm autocan-
nons with reduced rotational speed in order to reduce power. Crisis Group email correspond-
ence, March 2013. Crisis Group interview, Beijing, February 2013.  
338	“Defence of Japan 2012”, Japanese defence ministry, 2012, p. 197. 
339	Japanese defence guidelines explicitly state that such an order from the prime minister can 
be issued if a foreign submarine is “navigating underwater in Japan’s territorial waters”, as was 
the case with a Chinese submarine on 10 November 2004. ”Defence of Japan 2012”, op. cit., p. 197. 
According to a Japanese maritime security analyst, if the coastguard cannot keep up with suspicious 
vessels that intrude into the territorial seas or if the suspicious vessels have more powerful weapons, 
an order for maritime security operations could be issued. Crisis Group interview, Tokyo, October 
2012. 
340	Crisis Group interviews, Beijing, September-October 2012. 
341	Crisis Group interview, Beijing, October 2012.  
342	Crisis Group interview, Beijing, November 2012. 
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words of a former Japanese diplomat, is determined to “respond with strength” 
to see “which side will become exhausted first”.343 Taiwan’s claim adds complexity 
and risks, as Taiwanese fishermen regularly sail into disputed waters and confront 
the JCG in order to affirm Taiwan’s claim.344 
The risks for a military incident also exist in the air space above the East China 
Sea. On 13 December 2012, in the first direct military involvement after the island 
purchase, the SDF scrambled eight F-15 fighter jets in response to a China Marine 
Surveillance propeller aircraft conducting “sea-air 3-D patrol” together with a Ma-
rine Surveillance fleet.345 On 19 January 2013, responding to a U.S. aircraft flying 
near the Japan-China median line in the East China Sea, China sent two J-10 
fighters to tail it, triggering the Japanese ASDF to scramble its fighters.346  
Military aerial encounters are far from isolated incidents.347 Their overlapping 
EEZ claims in the East China Sea provide a source of friction. Japan has estab-
lished its air defence identification zone (ADIZ), an area that it designates as sen-
sitive to its national security, to the boundary of its claimed EEZ. When unidentified 
foreign planes enter the zone, the ASDF issues an order to scramble and its fighters 
can “issue warnings and force them to land” if they enter Japanese airspace. 348 
China does not designate such a zone, but claims that it has the right to intercept 
foreign military flights in the airspace of its claimed EEZ, as they are said to pose 
a national security and “even electronic invasion” threat.349 The unresolved mari-
time delineation in the East China Sea means one side’s patrols above its claimed 
EEZ can be seen as an infringement or potential threat by the other.  
An unexpected aerial encounter carries a higher risk for incident than a mari-
time skirmish, due to the need for much faster decision-making and the attendant’s 
risk of a miscalculation.350 A fighter pilot has more limited time to make manoeu-
vres to avoid a collision, and may have to interpret his rules of engagement and 
make decisions regarding his/her missions in defence of territorial integrity, in a 
much shorter timeframe than his maritime counterparts, meaning a situation could 
 
 
343	Crisis Group interview, Beijing, November 2012.  
344	See Appendix B. 
345	“国家海洋局组织中国开展钓鱼岛海空立体巡航”, 家海洋局网站 [“State Oceanic Administra-
tion organises sea and air 3D patrol on Diaoyu Islands”, State Oceanic Administration website], 
13 December 2012. “Chinese airplane enters Japanese airspace over Senkakus for 1st time”, 
Kyodo News, 13 December 2012. Japan said it was the first time China violated its air space 
since monitoring of the area began in 1958. “China calls on Japan to halt entries into disputed 
waters”, Reuters, 13 December 2012. The Chinese flight exposed weaknesses in Japan’s aerial 
defence as the Marine Surveillance plane escaped SDF radar detection. 
346	“Japan, China scrambled fighters during Jan. 19 radar action”, The Asahi Shimbun, 6 February 
2013. 
347	According to General Shigeru Iwasaki, the SDF joint chief of staff, SDF fighters were scrambled 
against Chinese aircraft approaching Japanese airspace 91 times between October and December 
2012. “Japanese fighters scrambled 160 times to ward off Chinese planes April-Dec 2012”, Kyodo 
News, 24 January 2013.  
348	Richard C. Bush, The Perils of Proximity, op. cit. p. 68. 
349	任筱锋, “专属经济区及海峡水道军事利用的法律问题”, 北大法律网 [Ren Youfeng, “Legal issues 
on military usage in EEZ and intra-coastal waterway”, China Law Information (online)], 2005. 
350	There are commonly used emergency or air distress frequencies for pilots to communicate 
through radio, as well as non-radio methods, such as internationally recognised manoeuvres 
that indicate emergency or degradation of equipment, or hand signals if within visual range of 
another plane. But when there are questions of intent, both sides need to know how specific 
signals will be interpreted by the other. Crisis Group email correspondence, January 2013. 
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develop faster than at sea, as the deadly 2001 EP-3 incident between the U.S. and 
China demonstrated.351  
An accidental collision is not the only potential for escalation. Deliberate acts 
by frontline actors could also trigger an armed exchange. Chinese naval vessels 
reportedly twice locked weapons-targeting radars, which use radio waves to detect 
a target and direct weapons, at SDF targets in January 2013.352 Such an act could 
be interpreted as “hostile intent” and trigger the use of force from the target.353 
China denied that such incidents took place.354  
Frictions between the two militaries and risks for an armed incident did not 
begin with the island dispute and are unlikely to diminish soon. China’s naval 
modernisation comprises an emphasis on training and exercise, including in the 
East China Sea, in order to give the navy practical experience and to enhance 
combat readiness.355 According to a Chinese analyst, PLA commanders do not see 
it necessary to communicate with their Japanese counterparts about such mis-
sions.356 Japan observes these drills from what it describes as a “safe distance” 
that China often deems as too close.357 A Japanese defence official said China 
takes “offence” at Japanese monitoring and sometimes acts proactively by flying 
 
 
351	Crisis Group email correspondence, January 2013. On 1 April 2001, a Chinese F-8II collided 
with a U.S. reconnaissance EP-3 aircraft 105km south east of Hainan, resulting in the death of 
the pilot, Wang Wei, and the emergency landing of the U.S. aircraft on Hainan Island where the 
24-member crew was detained for ten days. James Mulvenon, “Civil-Military Relations and the 
EP-3 Crisis: A Content Analysis”, China Leadership Monitor, no. 1 (Winter 2002), p. 2-3.  
352	“Extra press conference by Defence minister”, press release, Japanese defence ministry, 
5 February 2013. 
353	“Hostile intent” is the threat of the imminent use of force. For more information, see “Rules 
of Engagement Handbook,” International Institute of Humanitarian Law, November 2009, 
Appendix 4 to Annex A.  
354	“日本舰机近距离跟踪监视是造成中日海空安全问题的根源”, 新华社 [“Root cause of China-
Japan sea and air security problems is close tailing and monitoring by Japanese vessels and 
planes”, Xinhua News Agency], 8 February 2013. A Chinese analyst with ties to the navy said 
radar painting was a decision that would be made by a frigate commander, but an order to fire 
would “have to come from way above”. China’s denial represents a tacit understanding that ra-
dar locking was a violation of international rules of engagement. Crisis Group interview, Beijing, 
February 2013. 
355	“East China Sea tension: China conducts naval exercise”, BBC, 19 October 2012; “China navy 
to carry out Pacific exercises”, BBC, 24 November 2011; “Chinese navy fleet completes largest-
ever training in Pacific”, Want China Times, 25 June 2011; “PLA Navy’s live-ammunition train-
ing in East China Sea”, Xinhua News Agency, 7 July 2010. See also Richard C. Bush, The Perils 
of Proximity, op. cit., p. 54. Lyle Goldstein, “Non-Military Escalation: China Cultivates New 
Heft in Civilian Maritime Forces”, The Jamestown Foundation: China Brief, vol. 12, no. 23 
(30 November 2012), p. 13. 
356	Crisis Group interview, Beijing, August 2012. 
357	Crisis Group interview, Tokyo, July 2011. There is no international norm against one country 
observing another country’s naval exercise on the high seas. The U.S. and Russia, for example, 
often watch each other’s drills. Crisis Group interview, March 2013. 
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close to SDF vessels.358 The January 2013 alleged radar-painting incidents similarly 
followed observation by a Japanese unit of PLA Navy fleet exercises.359  
More generally, China’s rapid military modernisation has been fuelling suspi-
cion in Japan about Chinese intentions.360 Japan has boosted regional ties and 
focused on strengthening its own capabilities.361 The cabinet in January 2013 re-
quested from parliament a ¥40 billion ($440 million) increase in the defence 
budget, the biggest increase in two decades and the first in eleven years.362 The 
increase in military spending was calibrated to “ensure quick response capability” 
to “securely protect Japan’s national land and territorial waters and airspace”.363 
A former Japanese diplomat said, “it’s the first time since the war that Japan 
awakened to see security so important”.364  
Stalled or abandoned efforts to establish military-to-military communications 
and maritime exchanges have prevented opportunities to lower mistrust and clear 
misunderstandings. A defence communication mechanism to prevent a maritime 
incident was first proposed in 2007 by Shinzo Abe and Wen Jiabao.365 After several 
years of negotiation, some channels of the communications system were scheduled 
to begin operation by the end of 2012.366 However, following the 2012 island pur-
chase, talks were suspended and informal exchanges abolished.367  
 
 
358	This happened in April 2010 and again in March 2011 in the East China Sea. Crisis Group 
interview, Tokyo, July 2011. “Japan protests over ‘dangerous’ China helicopter fly-by”, BBC, 8 
March 2011; “China denies helicopter flying too close to Japanese destroyer”, Xinhua News 
Agency, 31 March 2011. 
359	Chinese state media reported that the PLA Navy North Sea Fleet began a live ammunition 
drill on 29 January 2013 in heavy fog. One of the frigates called Yancheng trained its radar on a 
Japanese destroyer the next day. “北海舰队联合机动编队破雾出征遭遇’猛张飞”, 中国军网, 
[“North Sea Fleet drill through fog, met with ‘intrepid Zhang Fei’”, PLA Daily (online)], 6 Feb-
ruary 2013. “日媒称中国舰船雷达’瞄准’日舰 双方当事舰机解读”, 中国新闻网 [“Japanese media 
said Chinese frigate radar ‘aimed’ at Japanese ship, deciphering both parties’ ships and planes”, 
Chinanews.com], 6 February 2013. 
360	In its 2012 white paper, the Japanese defence ministry stated that China’s military expansion 
and modernisation as well as its increased activities in surrounding waters, some near Japan, were 
a “matter of concern for the region and the international community”. “Defense of Japan 2012”, 
op. cit., p. 28.  
361	“Japan’s Abe turns to Southeast Asia to counter China”, Reuters, 16 January 2013. Japan 
promised to give the Philippines patrol boats and communication equipment for help with sur-
veillance in the South China Sea. “Philippines asks Japan for help amid China dispute”, Associ-
ated Press, 10 January 2013. According to a Japanese analyst, a September 2011 agreement to 
strengthen maritime cooperation was designed to hedge against China. Crisis Group interview, 
Tokyo, October 2012. 
362	“Japan to boost military headcount amid China island row”, Reuters, 27 January 2013.  
363	“Press conference with the Defence Minister”, press release, Japanese defence ministry, 8 
January 2013. “Defence budget to increase for first time in 11 years”, Bloomberg, 30 January 2013. 
364	Crisis Group interview, Beijing, November 2012. 
365 “中日将加强防务联络机制 防止发生海上不测事态”, 中国新闻网 [“China, Japan will strengthen 
defence communication mechanism to prevent maritime accidents”, Chinanews.com], 11 April 2007. 
366	Between 2007 and June 2012, the two sides held three rounds of expert consultation, during 
which they “reached basic agreements on the objective, structure and method of communica-
tions, and discussed the overall framework and technical issues of such a mechanism”. “中日防
务部门海上联络机制第三轮专家组磋商在北京举行”, 新华社, [“Third round of expert consulta-
tion on China-Japan defence communication mechanism was held in Beijing”, Xinhua News 
Agency], 29 June 2012. 
367	“国防部就中日关系、多边军事交流等问题答记者问”, 新华社 [Defence ministry answers jour-
nalists’ questions on Sino-Japanese relationship and multilateral military exchanges”], Xinhua 
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After the 2010 boat collision, both sides began to negotiate a separate communi-
cations mechanism that involved several layers including law enforcement agen-
cies, militaries and foreign ministries.368 They held a first round of talks in May 
2012, involving the JCG meeting with Chinese law enforcement agencies, but the 
second round scheduled for the second half of 2012 in Japan was scuttled after 
the island purchase.369 A high-level political agreement is required before ministerial 
or military-level talks can restart; this, Chinese analysts say, reduces the likelihood 
of a resumption of discussions.370 
An incident, whether initiated deliberately or by miscalculation, would be very 
difficult to de-escalate. Both Chinese and Japanese frontline actors would have a 
monopoly over information; vested interests in emphasising the responsibility of 
the other side while exonerating its own; and would be influenced by ingrained 
beliefs about the other’s intentions.371 Top leaders therefore run the risk of receiv-
ing incomplete or inaccurate information that would encourage a certain response. 
Such a risk was demonstrated in the EP-3 incident.372 China could fall into a 
“commitment trap”, whereby the leadership issues ultimatums from which it can 
be difficult to walk back.373 Its overall priority – foreign policy included – is main-
taining domestic political stability and its own legitimacy, meaning that its leader-
ship could easily feel compelled to take escalatory measures against Japan in the 
case of an armed skirmish rather than risk its legitimacy by appearing too soft.374  
 
 
News Agency, 25 October 2012. The Japanese think-tank The Nippon Foundation in October 2012 
abolished a decades-old program of defence exchanges between the two countries’ field officers 
after receiving a request from its Chinese counterpart to postpone the 2012 visits. “Nippon Foun-
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368	“Japan-People’s Republic of China summit meeting (summary)”, press release, Japanese 
foreign ministry, 25 December 2011. 
369	“中日举行第一轮海洋事务高级别磋商” [“China-Japan met for first high-level maritime af-
fairs discussion”], press release, Chinese foreign ministry, 16 May 2012. Crisis Group interview, 
Tokyo, October 2012. Japan has been urging China to return to such consultations. 
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opment of Military-to-Military Relationships” in Andrew S. Erikson, Lyle J. Goldstein and Nan 
Li (eds.), China, the United States, and 21st Century Power: Defining a Maritime Security 
Partnership (Annapolis, 2010), p. 45.  
371	Richard C. Bush, “China-Japan Security Relations”, Brookings (October 2010), pp. 3-5. 
372	The Chinese version, reportedly provided by the PLA to the top leaders, was that the EP-3, a 
large propeller driven aircraft, suddenly veered and collided with the Chinese F-8II plane. The 
U.S. said that the pilot, Wang Wei, flew dangerously close to the EP-3 and later provided video 
evidence of previous incidents of Wang flying provocatively close to U.S. aircrafts. Washington 
also asserted its plane was slow and very large, thus making it unlikely to have performed the 
quick maneuver as described by China. James Mulvenon, op. cit., pp. 2-3. 
373	Michael D. Swaine, “Chinese Crisis Management: Framework for Analysis, Tentative Obser-
vations, and Questions for the Future” in Andrew Scobell and Larry W. Wortzel (eds.), Chinese 
National Security Decisionmaking Under Stress (Carlisle, 2005), p. 32.  
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VIII. Conclusion 
The disputed waters around the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands have been the scene of a 
volatile standoff since September 2012. Taking advantage of a move by the Japa-
nese government to purchase three of the disputed islands, China began regularly 
dispatching law enforcement vessels to the area in a bid to establish overlapping 
administration. The Chinese response continued a tactic that Beijing has used in 
other maritime disputes; termed “reactive assertiveness”, it uses an action by a 
rival claimant as an opportunity to change the facts on the ground in its favour. 
In each case, Beijing intends to irreversibly establish a new status quo that en-
hances its administration over disputed areas. In the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands 
dispute, Beijing has made it clear that it aims to make overlapping control a new 
reality that Japan must accept. The prolonged standoff has reinforced hostile 
public perceptions and popularised the notion that an armed clash could erupt. 
However, both governments have, at least publicly, expressed the desire to avoid 
a military conflict and to mend bilateral relations. Additionally, negotiations on a 
China-Japan-South Korea free trade agreement continue uninterrupted, demon-
strating mutual desire for robust economic ties. Economic growth continues to be 
a focus of Chinese leaders and an important national goal for Japan. The comple-
mentary economic relationship between the two countries can continue to be a point 
of stability in an otherwise unpredictable relationship. 
Yet despite the two sides’ stated desire to avoid armed conflict, an increased 
number of vessels now patrol in close proximity in disputed waters, heightening the 
risk of an accidental clash. The risks are palpable, and the China-Japan dynamic 
remains one incident away from moving from dangerous escalation to full-blown 
crisis. The danger is not confined to seas around the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands, with 
the international waters and air space in the East China Sea also theatres of friction. 
Stalled efforts to establish military-to-military communications and maritime ex-
changes have prevented opportunities to lower mistrust, clear misunderstanding 
and open channels of communication.  
An incident, whether deliberate or by miscalculation, would be difficult to de-
escalate. The traditional problem-solving and back-channel mechanisms that oper-
ated for decades have disappeared. Chinese and Japanese maritime or military actors 
would have a monopoly over information and a vested interest in accusing the other 
side. Top leaders thus would run the risk of receiving incomplete or inaccurate 
information that could influence their response. The asymmetrical position of the 
respective foreign ministries leaves them unlikely to be able to help defuse a crisis. 
Heightened nationalism, especially in China, could make diplomatic manoeuvres 
that are necessary for crisis mitigation politically perilous.  
As a first step toward demonstrating a genuine intention to preserve peace, esca-
latory actions and aggressive rhetoric should cease. Given that a peaceful resolution 
to the sovereignty dispute is not immediately attainable, managing the dispute 
remains the most viable option. High-level diplomats from both countries have 
occasionally urged negotiations on crisis management mechanisms and top leaders 
need to provide the political space for behind-the-scenes diplomacy to focus on 
such talks. The shared desire to avoid a military conflict and complementary eco-
nomic ties offer substantive incentive and common ground for the world’s second 
and third largest economies to engage in meaningful contact with each other. 
Beijing/Brussels, 8 April 2013 
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Appendix A: Map of the East China Sea 
 
Copyright: Stratfor 2012. www.stratfor.com. Reproduced with permission. 
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Appendix B: Republic of China (Taiwan)’s Claim to the Islands 
The Republic of China (Taiwan) is another claimant to the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands, 
which it calls the Diaoyutai. Its claim is based on the same historical title as the 
People’s Republic of China (China), and states the islands were returned to Taiwan 
after the Second World War.375 As tensions between China and Japan heated up 
in 2012, Taiwanese President Ma Ying-jeou announced a five-point East China 
Sea Peace Initiative proposal that August.376 After Japan purchased the islands in 
September, approximately 40 Taiwanese fishing boats travelled to the islands to 
assert Taiwan’s claim, escorted by ten Taiwan Coast Guard Administration (TCGA) 
vessels. TCGA and Japan Coast Guard cutters fired water cannons at each other.377 
Taiwanese Premier Jiang Yi-huah later instructed the TCGA to escort all Taiwanese 
fishermen operating around the islands.378 In January 2013, Taiwanese activists 
travelled near the islands but were prevented from landing by the JCG.379 After 
the incident, the Taiwanese foreign ministry said it did not want the dispute to 
damage relations with Japan.380 It has also said that Taiwan will not align with 
the Mainland over discussions on the island dispute.381  
Apart from the sovereignty dispute, fishing rights around the islands have 
been a source of contention between Taiwan and Japan. Taiwanese fishermen 
contend they have traditionally fished in the waters near the islands, but are often 
chased away by Japanese vessels. The two sides have been negotiating on a for-
mal agreement for fishing rights since 1996. Taipei and Tokyo have held sixteen 
rounds of negotiations, the last of which took place in 2009. Preparatory meet-
ings for the seventeenth round were held in November 2012 and March 2013 in 
Tokyo. No substantial progress was reported.382  
China considers Taiwan a province, a stance that Japan states it “fully under-
stands and respects”.383 
 
 
 
375	For Taiwan’s full legal position, see “The Diaoyutai Islands An Inherent Part of the Territory 
of the Republic of China (Taiwan)”, press release, Taiwanese foreign ministry, 9 April 2012. 
376	The East China Sea Peace Initiative includes: (1) refrain from taking any antagonistic ac-
tions; (2) shelve controversies and not abandon dialogue; (3) observe international law and re-
solve disputes through peaceful means; (4) seek consensus on a code of conduct in the East 
China Sea; (5) establish a mechanism for cooperation on exploring and developing resources in 
the East China Sea. “President Ma proposes the East China Sea Peace Initiative, calls on all par-
ties concerned to resolve Diaoyutai dispute peacefully”, press release, Taiwanese foreign minis-
try, 5 August 2012. 
377	“Local, Japan vessels clash off Diaoyutais”, The China Post, 25 September 2012; “Japan, 
Taiwan in disputed isle water cannon duel”, Agence France-Presse, 25 September 2012.  
378	“Cabinet, CGA safeguard Diaoyutai fishing rights”, Taiwan Today, 22 February 2013 
379 “Japan turns Taiwan activists back from disputed islands”, BBC, 24 January 2013.  
380	“Diaoyutai voyage should not affect fishery talks: MOFA”, Central News Agency, 24 January 
2013. 
381	“Taiwan insists it will not collaborate with China on the Diaoyutais”, Central News Agency, 
19 February 2013. 
382	“Taiwan still negotiating with Japan on expanded fishing rights”, Central News Agency, 20 
March 2013. 
383	“Joint Communiqué of the Government of Japan and the Government of the People’s Re-
public of China”, Article 3, 29 September 1972. 
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Appendix C: China’s Maritime Law Enforcement Agencies 
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